The unopposed election of Gagan Kumar Thapa as President of the Nepali Congress (NC) on

January 15, 2026, has transformed an internal leadership dispute into a full-fledged institutional

rupture, compounding the political instability unleashed by Nepal’s Gen-Z uprising four months

earlier. Rather than restoring coherence to the country’s oldest democratic party, the move has

entrenched factionalism at a moment when Nepal’s political system is already struggling with a

profound legitimacy deficit.

The second Special General Convention (SGC), held in Kathmandu with the backing of over 60 per

cent of NC general convention delegates, elected Thapa and a new slate of office-bearers

unanimously. On January 16, the Election Commission of Nepal formally recognised the outcome,

concluding that the SGC was convened in accordance with party statutes and that the delegates’

authority was supreme. With this decision, all resolutions adopted between January 11 and 14

gained legal force.

Institutional validation, however, did not resolve the crisis. It formalised a split.

The ousted leadership under Sher Bahadur Deuba rejected the SGC as unconstitutional and

coercive, insisting that Deuba remains the legitimate party president elected by the 14th General

Convention. Senior leaders aligned with him—including Shekhar Koirala and Bimalendra

Nidhi—have coalesced into a rival faction that continues to command loyalty among older cadres,

rural party committees, and entrenched patronage networks.

Since mid-January 2026, the Deuba camp has pursued a dual strategy: legal challenges against the

Election Commission’s decision and parallel political mobilisation through party meetings,

statements, and threats of street agitation. The result is a condition of dual authority, with two

competing centres of power claiming continuity of the NC legacy. Far from stabilising the party, the

Commission’s ruling has converted factional rivalry into a structural fracture with direct

implications for electoral coherence ahead of the March 5, 2026, elections.

This rupture cannot be understood in isolation from the Gen-Z uprising of September 8–9, 2025, the

most violent episode in Nepal’s recent political history. What began as protests against a

government-imposed social media ban rapidly evolved into a nationwide rebellion against

corruption, censorship, dynastic politics, and economic stagnation. The collapse of the K. P. Sharma

Oli government and the installation of Sushila Karki as Interim Prime Minister fundamentally

altered Nepal’s political calculus.

The revolt exposed the extent to which traditional parties—including the NC—had lost moral

authority, particularly among younger voters. During the crisis, the NC appeared divided, reactive,

and disconnected, reinforcing perceptions of institutional decay. For reformists, the uprising

underscored the urgency of renewal; for the old guard, it represented a destabilising force to be

contained rather than integrated. Gagan Thapa emerged as the most prominent beneficiary of the

post-revolt reformist moment. His emphasis on accountability, service delivery, and institutional

reform resonated with urban, educated constituencies shaped by the Gen-Z mobilisation. Critics,

however, accuse him of opportunism and external alignment, pointing to past diplomatic

engagement and Western-funded democracy initiatives. These claims remain contested and lack

clear evidence of organisational control over the decentralised youth movement, which remains

sceptical of party politics and resistant to co-optation.

Thapa may ride the prevailing anti-elite sentiment, but he does not command it. In the volatile post-

revolt environment, any perception that reformist rhetoric masks elite continuity could quickly

erode his credibility.

The NC split has unfolded amid broader instability: unresolved demands for accountability over

protest deaths, continued sit-ins by injured protesters and victims’ families, economic distress, and

rising concerns over radical mobilisation. While Nepal has remained free of insurgent violence,

political stability has increasingly depended on street pressure rather than institutional consensus.

As the March 2026 elections approach, the Nepali Congress—once a pillar of democratic

continuity—now mirrors the wider crisis of legitimacy gripping Nepal’s political system. Without



genuine internal democratisation, accountability for past violence, and meaningful youth inclusion,

the party’s fracture risks becoming not an aberration but a precursor to deeper systemic unraveling.

The Gen-Z revolt demonstrated that governance without legitimacy is no longer sustainable.

Whether Nepal’s political class can absorb that lesson before instability again spills onto the streets

remains the country’s most urgent and unresolved question.