Since the ouster of elected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh has been gripped by sustained political volatility, rising social unrest, and an unbroken cycle of violence. With just over a month remaining before the 13th National Parliamentary Elections scheduled for February 12, 2026, the country’s law enforcement agencies have acknowledged that a significant portion of the electoral process is under serious threat.

According to police data reported on January 7, 2026, 17,556 of Bangladesh’s 42,761 polling centres—more than one-third—have been classified as “risky.” The capital, Dhaka, accounts for the highest concentration of such centres. Of the 2,131 polling stations under the Dhaka Metropolitan Police, 695 have been designated “highly risky” and another 1,133 “risky.”

Other major urban centres show similarly alarming trends. In Chittagong, 312 of 607 polling centres have been labelled highly risky. Significant numbers of vulnerable polling stations have also been identified in Gazipur, Khulna, Sylhet, Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Barisal. The breadth of these designations points not to isolated instability, but to nationwide disorder.

In response to spiralling violence, the caretaker government headed by Muhammad Yunus launched Operation Devil Hunt in two phases.

During the first phase (February 8–March 2, 2025), security forces arrested 12,220 individuals, recovered 188 locally manufactured weapons, and seized 50 firearms. The second phase, initiated on December 13, 2025, has so far resulted in 15,009 arrests and the seizure of 218 firearms as of January 9, 2026.

The second phase followed a sharp escalation in violence triggered by the shooting of Sharif Osman Hadi, a senior leader and spokesperson of Inqilab Mancha, on December 12, 2025, in Dhaka. Hadi later succumbed to his injuries on December 18 while undergoing treatment in Singapore.

Despite these large-scale security operations, killings and targeted violence have continued unabated, raising serious concerns about the state’s capacity to secure the election environment.

Violence in 2026 has already claimed multiple lives in Dhaka alone. On January 8, unidentified gunmen shot dead former Swechchhasebak Dal leader Azizur Rahman Musabbir near the Super Star Hotel in Karwan Bazar, injuring another man. Two days earlier, scrap dealer Shahabuddin was hacked to death in Kadamtali. On January 1, lawyer Naeem Kibria was beaten to death in the Bashundhara Residential Area, while Shipon, a 24-year-old surgical assistant, was hacked to death in Hazaribagh the same day.

These incidents underline the erosion of basic law and order, even in areas traditionally considered secure.

Independent rights groups have documented a steep and sustained rise in violence. According to Ain o Salish Kendra, 102 people were killed in political violence in 2025, compared to 100 in 2024, 45 in 2023, and 70 in 2022. Mob violence has surged even more dramatically. ASK recorded 165 deaths due to mob beatings between January and October 2025 alone—a near five-fold increase from 28 in 2021.

The Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), in its annual report released on December 31, 2025, documented 914 incidents of political violence during the year, resulting in 133 deaths and 7,511 injuries. Those killed included activists from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Awami League, Jamaat-e-Islami, Inqilab Mancha, and extremist groups. Over 50,000 people were arrested, largely linked to Awami League–affiliated organisations, alongside at least 47 militants of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Mob lynching remained endemic, with HRSS recording 292 incidents in 2025, killing 168 people. Journalists were also increasingly targeted: 539 media workers were attacked or harassed in 318 incidents, with three killed.

The death of Sharif Osman Hadi proved a major inflection point. Shot by Faisal Karim Masud alias Daud Khan while riding pillion on a motorcycle driven by Alamgir Sheikh, Hadi’s killing occurred just one day after election dates were formally announced. Masud and Sheikh allegedly fled via the Haluaghat border route into India, a claim under investigation. The government has announced a reward of BDT 5 million for Masud’s arrest.

Following confirmation of Hadi’s death on December 18, protests erupted in Dhaka’s Shahbagh area, historically a mobilisation hub. Demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Tumi ke ami ke? Hadi, Hadi,” “Delhi na Dhaka? Dhaka, Dhaka,” and “Surround the Indian embassy.” Violence escalated after 11 pm as mobs vandalised the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, setting furniture and documents on fire while shouting religious and anti-India slogans.

Law enforcement remained largely absent until the Bangladesh Army was deployed after midnight on December 19.

The unrest rapidly spread nationwide. In Rajshahi, protesters bulldozed the Metropolitan Awami League office. Highways were blocked across districts. In Bandarban, mobs torched the residence of former Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs Minister Bir Bahadur U Shwe Sing, initially preventing firefighters from intervening.

Violence assumed an international dimension when protesters attacked the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong. Anti-India slogans intensified following Sheikh Hasina’s flight to New Delhi. Earlier, Inqilab Mancha leaders had warned that Indian diplomatic missions would be paralysed if suspects were sheltered in India.

Political parties—including BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, the National Citizen Party, and Islami Andolan of Bangladesh—issued statements portraying Hadi as a martyr, further legitimising public anger. The government condemned the violence, including the lynching of a Hindu man in Mymensingh, but the narrative battle had already shifted.

Collectively, these developments point to a deteriorating security environment marked by delayed law enforcement responses, politicised martyr narratives, rising radicalisation, and growing anti-India sentiment. With over one-third of polling centres already deemed risky, the upcoming election risks becoming not a stabilising event but another trigger for violence.

Bangladesh today stands at the edge of systemic breakdown—where elections, rather than resolving political conflict, may instead accelerate it.