?Bangladesh: Extremism on the rise
In October 2025, HeI escalated its agitation against the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON). On October 29, the organisation’s Khagrachari District branch formed a human chain demanding a nationwide ban on ISKCON, denouncing the group as an extremist Hindutva force. Days earlier, on October 24, HeI held a mass rally in Chittagong repeating similar accusations, portraying ISKCON as an “Indian agent” threatening Bangladesh’s religious and national identity. These protests reflect a broader pattern of hostility towards minorities and religious pluralism, consistent with HeI’s stance throughout the year. Similar objections earlier in 2025 targeted the Mongol Shobhajatra, Poyla Boishakh celebrations, Sufi practices, and Sufi shrines, with the organisation condemning such traditions as Hindu-rooted, neo-pagan, or deviant. Rising violence against Christians and Sufi communities since the fall of the Awami League government has been linked by observers to the growing empowerment of religious hardliners, including HeI.
The legacy of the May 5, 2013 Shapla Chattar crackdown continues to serve as a unifying narrative for HeI. On October 18, Local Government and Rural Development Adviser Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuiyan announced that a memorial would be constructed at Shapla Chattar to honour those killed during the 2013 operation. He also oversaw the distribution of financial grants to families of 58 individuals allegedly killed in the incident, as well as to relatives of 19 people who died during the 2021 anti-Modi protests. This institutional recognition underscores how deeply HeI’s demands have penetrated state policymaking during Bangladesh’s political transition. Earlier in May 2025, the organisation released a preliminary list alleging 93 fatalities from the 2013 operation, continuing to amplify the episode as a symbol of state brutality under the Awami League.
Despite such overt political engagement, HeI continues to describe itself as strictly religious and non-political. On October 13, Joint Secretary General Mamunul Haque reiterated that the organisation is “a pure religion-based apolitical entity” and that alliances with political parties contradict its principles. Yet HeI’s actions contradict these claims. The organisation has frequently intervened in electoral matters; on October 3, Chief Shah Muhibullah Babunagari urged followers at a major conference in Chittagong not to vote for Jamaat-e-Islami, accusing it of ideological deviation. In September, Mamunul Haque called for unity among Islamic parties to field single candidates in the February 2026 elections. These interventions highlight HeI’s increasing role as a political influencer, offering guidance on voting behaviour and negotiating indirectly with political blocs.
HeI’s influence also extends into national education and cultural policy. On October 13, Religious Affairs Adviser AFM Khalid Hossain confirmed that the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education was reviewing HeI’s demand to replace music teachers in government primary schools with religious teachers. Earlier, on September 21, HeI denounced the appointment of music teachers nationwide as part of an “anti-Islam agenda.” The organisation has persistently opposed social and cultural reforms, especially those related to women’s rights. In spring 2025, HeI mobilised tens of thousands at Suhrawardy Udyan and Baitul Mukarram National Mosque to demand the dissolution of the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission, which it labelled “anti-Quran” and “anti-Sunnah.” It warned the Interim Government against implementing reforms, drawing parallels to the political downfall of Sheikh Hasina.
As Bangladesh prepares for the February 2026 elections, HeI has become a critical political actor despite its refusal to register as a party. It has engaged with major political groups such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose leadership has courted its support. BNP Standing Committee member Salahuddin Ahmed met Babunagari on August 1, 2025 and publicly described the 2013 Shapla Chattar crackdown as the “most heinous massacre in world history.” Yet relations remain strained due to BNP’s failure to defend HeI during the 2013 operation, a point Mamunul Haque emphasised in May 2025. HeI has also aligned with the National Citizen Party (NCP) in calling for the Awami League to be declared a “criminal organisation.” Tensions rose further when the AL blamed HeI and BNP supporters for vandalism at the home of a senior AL figure in Netrokona in June 2025. Meanwhile, HeI’s distancing from Jamaat-e-Islami has deepened, with Babunagari dismissing JeI in August 2025 as a “hypocrite Islamic party” following Maududi instead of “the Islam of Madinah.”
HeI’s international posture reflects a mix of religious solidarity and nationalist suspicion. While opposing Western and Indian influence—most notably by protesting the proposed UN Human Rights Office and condemning Indian policies—it has strengthened connections with Islamic states and causes. In April 2025, HeI joined a global strike against Israeli military actions, and in July, Babunagari met the Palestinian Ambassador to discuss issues concerning the Muslim Ummah. Senior scholars associated with HeI and other Islamic groups travelled to Afghanistan in September at the invitation of the Taliban government, reflecting broader transnational Islamist engagement. At the same time, HeI has protested the Interim Government’s consideration of humanitarian corridors for Myanmar’s Rakhine state, claiming such decisions must align with national security and religious harmony.
Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, HeI has emerged as a formidable force shaping Bangladesh’s transitional politics. Drawing on its vast network of Qaumi madrasas, the organisation has repeatedly mobilised large crowds to oppose reforms it views as Western, secular, or anti-Islamic. Its demands for justice over the 2013 Shapla Chattar incident, combined with its embrace of conservative social norms and its deepening political entanglements, have bolstered its appeal among segments of the population seeking an Islamic state grounded in Sharia principles. At the same time, HeI’s rise has coincided with growing pressure on minorities, increased ideological polarisation, and a foreign policy discourse marked by anti-Western and anti-Indian rhetoric and strong pro-Palestine alignment.
As Bangladesh approaches a pivotal election, HeI’s expanding influence threatens to reshape not only electoral outcomes but also the country’s long-standing secular identity. The movement’s ideological rigidity, political pragmatism, and mass mobilisation capability position it as one of the most consequential actors determining the trajectory of Bangladesh’s society, politics, and international standing in the months ahead.
