The violent unrest that gripped Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) in late September and early October 2025 has once again exposed the deep fissures between the region’s population and the Pakistani state. The turbulence culminated on October 4, 2025, when authorities and the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) signed a 25-point accord to end nearly a week of mass protests that had paralysed life across the territory. The agreement, reached after prolonged negotiations in Muzaffarabad, promised compensation for families of those killed, restoration of subsidies, and commitments to improve infrastructure and essential services. Officials hailed the accord as a political success restoring calm, while protest leaders described it as a “partial victory” achieved at immense human cost.

The accord followed one of the most widespread protest movements in PoJK’s recent history. The JKJAAC, a coalition of traders, transporters, teachers, and lawyers, had called for a strike on September 29 after the government failed to respond to their 38-point charter of demands. These included relief from escalating electricity tariffs and food prices, greater local control over natural resources, and reforms in the region’s political structure. Within hours, major towns — Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Rawalakot, Kotli, and Neelum Valley — witnessed complete shutdowns. Shops closed, public transport stopped, and schools were suspended. Authorities imposed sweeping restrictions on movement and communication, cutting mobile and internet services across several districts. These measures deepened public anger and crippled independent reporting.

The situation soon turned violent. Clashes between demonstrators and Security Forces (SFs) were reported from multiple areas. By October 3, fatalities had risen to between eight and twelve, including police personnel, with hundreds injured. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) expressed alarm over the violence and condemned the use of excessive force against protesters. It criticised the communications blackout, warning that such measures undermined transparency and accountability. The HRCP urged the authorities to uphold the right to peaceful protest and called for impartial investigations into civilian and police deaths. Images of confrontations in Muzaffarabad and Neelum Valley, showing SF personnel firing into crowds and ambulances rushing the wounded to hospitals, circulated widely before the blackout, amplifying public outrage and compelling Islamabad to return to the negotiating table.

Initially, the agitation had been driven by economic grievances. Skyrocketing electricity bills, shortages of subsidised wheat, and rising inflation had made daily life increasingly untenable for ordinary citizens. The frustration was compounded by the irony that PoJK generates a significant portion of Pakistan’s hydropower through projects such as Mangla and Neelum–Jhelum, yet its own residents endure frequent power cuts and underfunded infrastructure. Protesters argued that their resources power Pakistan’s major provinces while their communities remain neglected. What began as a struggle for affordable electricity and food, swiftly evolved into a broader political movement questioning the governance framework itself. The demand for an equitable share in resource revenues became symbolic of a wider call for autonomy, accountability, and respect.

Long-standing complaints about the misuse of development funds and the privileges of the political elite further fuelled anger. Residents pointed to the perks enjoyed by senior officials – official vehicles, fuel allowances, and personal security – while ordinary citizens struggled with unemployment and poor public services. This disparity, protesters argued, highlighted a fundamental disconnect between rulers and the ruled. The 38-point JKJAAC charter also sought the abolition of 12 seats in the Legislative Assembly reserved for refugees from the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which locals claim are used by Islamabad to maintain control over PoJK.

The government’s approach combined coercion with negotiation. Curfews were imposed in several districts, and paramilitary reinforcements were deployed from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. At the same time, federal ministers and local officials opened talks with protest leaders. The October 4 agreement offered compensation to the families of the dead, subsidies on electricity and wheat, and commitments for new public works in health, education, and transport. However, the government refused to abolish the refugee-reserved seats or significantly alter the privileges of senior officials, citing constitutional and fiscal constraints. This refusal left many demonstrators sceptical of the government’s sincerity. The JKJAAC agreed to suspend, rather than end, its campaign, pending visible progress on implementation.

PoJK has seen major cycles of protest in the past. The 1955 Poonch (Sudhan) uprising was a major revolt against Pakistan’s central authority, driven by local leaders’ opposition to political centralization and the dismissal of elected representatives, particularly after the dismissal of the popular Sardar Ibrahim Khan government, and it was harshly suppressed by the military and law enforcement agencies, leaving a lasting distrust toward federal authority. Over the decades, recurrent smaller protests have arisen, typically in response to economic hardship and political marginalization, with cycles of local mobilization, intermittent concessions, and a lack of structural reform persisting through 2025. The 2025 protests led by the JKAAC reflect long-standing grievances of neglect, repression, economic exploitation, and political exclusion, and were met with brutal suppression, fatalities, injuries, communication blackouts, and heavy security crackdowns. The broader political environment in Pakistan’s peripheral regions, including PoJK, continues to prioritize control and suppression over political inclusion and economic development, perpetuating cycles of unrest and repression.

PoJK remains one of the most economically underdeveloped territories under Islamabad’s control. Nearly one-third of households in PoJK live below the poverty line, as reported in official planning documents. The road density stands at just 0.78 kilometres per square kilometre, significantly lower than Pakistan’s national average of 1.2 kilometre, restricting trade and access to markets. Agriculture employs over 40 per cent of the working population but contributes less than 20 per cent to local GDP, reflecting low productivity and outdated practices. Industrial activity is negligible, with fewer than 400 registered industrial units across ten districts, many operating below capacity due to power shortages and poor logistics. Reports by the World Bank (2024) confirm that PoJK’s economy depends heavily on fiscal transfers from Islamabad and international aid, making it vulnerable to Pakistan’s recurring economic crises and currency instability.

Public infrastructure and social services in PoJK are equally fragile. Official data shows that only 56 per cent of the population has access to clean drinking water, while electricity shortages reach up to 18 hours per day in rural districts like Neelum and Bagh. Health infrastructure remains weak, with fewer than 700 hospital beds across the entire region — about 0.5 beds per 1,000 people, well below Pakistan’s average of 0.9. The PoJK Education Department estimates the literacy rate at 76 per cent, but functional literacy and employment opportunities are low, forcing thousands of young people to migrate to mainland Pakistan or abroad. The HRCP and leading media outlets like The Washington Post and Dawn confirm that repeated protests over electricity tariffs, food prices, and job scarcity underscore decades of economic neglect. With minimal private investment, limited institutional autonomy, and heavy central control from Islamabad, PoJK continues to exhibit chronic economic backwardness – marked by poverty, unemployment, and an absence of sustainable development. The sense of exclusion is particularly acute in remote districts such as Neelum and Leepa, where poor connectivity and inadequate infrastructure isolate communities for months each year. Residents see their struggle not merely as economic hardship but as a fight for dignity and recognition.

In the early 2000s and 2010s, protests over rationing, tariff hikes, and infrastructure neglect erupted in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. The situation deteriorated further after 2022, as Pakistan’s broader economic crisis deepened. Inflation, fuel shortages, and austerity measures hit PoJK hard, where dependence on dwindling federal transfers left little local capacity to absorb the shock. By 2023, the JKJAAC had evolved into a broad civil coalition, uniting diverse professional groups across districts. The May 2024 “long march” to Muzaffarabad, in which five people, including a Police officer, were killed, was a precursor to the larger unrest of 2025. Although Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif responded then with a relief package and a judicial commission, slow implementation reignited anger, setting the stage for renewed confrontation.

The recent turmoil also exposed the communication gap between Islamabad and its peripheries. The government’s decision to shut down digital and mobile networks during the crisis deepened perceptions of alienation. Independent journalists were unable to verify casualty figures or monitor police operations, leaving the public dependent on incomplete and often contradictory reports. The HRCP stressed that information blackouts not only violate citizens’ rights but also encourage misinformation and mistrust. Despite official claims of restraint, eyewitness accounts pointed to indiscriminate firing, arbitrary detentions, and intimidation.

International reactions followed swiftly. India’s Ministry of External Affairs condemned the crackdown, asserting that Pakistan must be held accountable for its “horrific human rights violations” in the occupied territories. It described the protests as a natural consequence of Pakistan’s exploitative governance. Pakistani officials, meanwhile, accused India of politicising the situation. Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal appealed to protesters to “avoid lighting a fire that could benefit our enemy country,” reflecting Islamabad’s persistent framing of the unrest through a national security lens rather than as a governance crisis.

The October 4 accord attempts to address PoJK grievances by establishing a joint monitoring and implementation committee. However, its effectiveness will depend on transparent oversight and sustained political will. Promises of subsidies and compensation will have little meaning unless backed by verifiable disbursement mechanisms and time-bound development projects. HRCP has urged authorities to ensure that the agreement’s implementation remains open to civic scrutiny and that no reprisals occur against protesters or organisers. Without these safeguards, the accord risks becoming another temporary reprieve in an unbroken cycle of unrest.

The 2025 PoJK unrest carries implications beyond the immediate territory. It underscores the fragility of Pakistan’s federal system and the challenge of managing peripheral regions that feel economically exploited and politically voiceless. Continued neglect could intensify demands for greater autonomy and foster renewed instability. The crisis also undermines Islamabad’s diplomatic position on the Kashmir issue, exposing contradictions between its rhetoric of self-determination and the governance realities in territories under its own control.

Ultimately, the October agreement offers only a pause. Its success will depend on whether Islamabad and Muzaffarabad can translate promises into tangible reforms that redistribute resources, enhance local representation, and restore trust. The grievances that fuelled the uprising are rooted in decades of neglect and inequity. If the familiar pattern of superficial concessions continues, renewed unrest is inevitable. The events of 2025, like those of 1955 and 2024 before them, demonstrate that durable stability in PoJK cannot be achieved through coercion, but only through credible governance, equitable development, and genuine accountability.