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Balochistan: Spiralling retaliation
  • ?Balochistan: Spiralling retaliation
    ?Balochistan: Spiralling retaliation
In the early morning of August 26, 2024, at least 23 Punjabi travellers were killed in the Rarasham area of Musakhail District in Balochistan when cadres of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) offloaded passengers from trucks and buses and shot at them after checking their identities. According to Musakhail Assistant Commissioner Najeeb Kakar, armed men blocked the inter-provincial highway in the Rarasham area of the district and offloaded passengers from buses. The armed men also set fire to 10 vehicles. “Vehicles travelling to and from Punjab were inspected, and individuals from Punjab were identified and shot,” Kakar added.  

As the day progress, Balochistan witnessed multiple attacks by Baloch insurgents across the province which left at least 38 people dead, including the 23 in Musakhail. In response, Security Forces (SFs) neutralised 21 terrorists and injured several others. BLA cadres targeted Levies and Police Stations in Mastung, Kalat, Pasni, and Suntsar, resulting in numerous casualties. Explosions and grenade attacks were reported in Sibi, Panjgur, Mastung, Turbat, Bela, and Quetta, with terrorists blowing up a railway track near Mastung. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a statement later in the day, claiming that 21 terrorists had been killed, while 14 SF personnel, including four from law enforcement agencies, were killed during clearance operations. 

However, in a statement released on its official media Hakkal, the BLA announced the successful completion of its Fidayeen Operation Herof(Operation Dark Storm), claiming to have killed 130 military personnel during a series of coordinated attacks across Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that the group’s elite Fidayeen unit, the Majeed Brigade, had “maintained control over the Bela camp for 20 hours,” during which “68 military personnel were killed and dozens more injured.” The BLA statement further claimed that four of its Fidayeen (suicide attackers) – including a female fighter named Mahal Baloch aka Zilan Kurd, from Sur Bandar, Gwadar, and Rizwan Baloch aka Hammal, from Panwan, Gwadar, were killed during the operation. The BLA also reported that its Fateh Squad and Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS) had set up blockades on major highways across Balochistan, leading to the deaths of 62 military personnel. “After achieving the objectives of Operation Herof, the roadblocks on all highways were lifted,” the statement read. 

This attack came against the backdrop of the Army’s undeclared ongoing operations in several parts of Balochistan. On August 22, 2024, SFs were conducting large-scale operations in the Mastung and Bolan Districts of Balochistan, deploying both ground troops and helicopter gunships. According to media reports, Army infantry and aerial operations had been ongoing for several preceding days, in these regions, with more than seven combat helicopters participating. 

On August 19, 2024, the Army reportedly initiated a military operation in the Kalat District of Balochistan. The operation began early August 19-morning in Naghao, a mountainous area of Kalat District. The areas of Maru, Shishar, Islanji, and their surroundings were also under the operation. Frequent flights of gunships and other helicopters were undertaken, with shelling and explosions heard at several locations. 

On August 18, 2024, the military also conducted operation in several areas of Kech District, with foot patrols, blockades, and helicopter gunships observed across the region. A significant number of military personnel were seen moving through Nasirabad, while several areas in Dasht were surrounded by SFs. Helicopter gunships were also seen flying over the Buleda area.

Military actions and counter-actions in Balochistan have made the province a very volatile region in recent years, and the troubles are escalating. The first eight months of the current year have almost touched the annual fatalities of the previous year. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Balochistan has recorded a total 442 terrorism-related fatalities, including 180 civilians, 144 SF personnel and 118 terrorists, in the current year (data till August 31, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, the province had recorded 267 such fatalities including 142 SF personnel, 69 civilians and 56 terrorists. The whole of 2023 recorded 471 such fatalities, including 186 SF personnel, 160 civilians and 125 terrorists. 

Meanwhile, a comparative analysis of terrorism-related fatalities in the first eight months of each respective year in the province shows 2024 with the highest since 2015: 442 in 2024, 267 in 2023, 250 in 2022, 195 in 2021, 136 in 2020, 158 in 2019, 338 in 2018, 211 in 2017 and 414 in 2016. In 2015, there were 481 fatalities in the first eight months.   

On year-on-year basis, 2023 recorded 471 such fatalities, the highest since 2016. There were 406 fatalities in 2022, 308 in 2021, 215 in 2020, 180 in 2019, 384 in 2018, 341 in 2017 and 636 in 2016. With the present equation and four months to go for the current year, fatalities may cross the record of previous years.  

The long-term state policy of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings has led to a spiral of retaliatory attacks and violence by Baloch insurgents, targeting SFs and state establishments in the province. Civilians, especially members of state-backed ‘death squad’ have also been targeted. In this environment of chaos, Islamist terrorist groups have also thrived and even joined the Baloch groups. The major active Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch National Army (BNA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). Some of the major attacks by the Baloch insurgent groups on SF personnel and military establishments in the provinces during the current year include: 

August 14: Three soldiers were killed and another four sustained injuries when BLF cadres attacked military checkpoints in the Bondki, Oghar, Malsh-e-Band and Thank areas of the Mashkay tehsil (revenue unit) in Awaran District. BLF ‘spokesperson’ ‘major’ Gwahram Baloch claimed responsibility for these attacks. 

July 23: Three Pakistani soldiers and one Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) ‘patrol commander’ were killed when the BLA cadres attacked a military post in the Sami area of Kech District. In a media statement, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack. Jeeyand Baloch claimed another team of BLA cadres also targeted and destroyed machinery of an ‘exploitative project’ near the military camp.

July 9: Four Army soldiers were killed and another three sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military convoy on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) route in the Sami area of Kech District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch issued a statement to the media claiming responsibility for the attack. 

June 24: At least 11 soldiers were killed and an unspecified number sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military camp in the Iskalko area of Kalat District. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. 

March 25: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the PNS Siddique Naval Air Station in the Turbat town of Kech District and claimed that more than 30 soldiers were killed. The Army, however, stated it thwarted the attack and killed four BLA cadres, while one soldier was killed.

March 20: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Complex in Gwadar town (Gwadar District) and killed two soldiers. SFs, however, stated that they thwarted the attack and killed eight BLA cadres.

January 29: Nine BLA cadres, four Railway Police personnel and two civilians were killed, while four others, including two SF personnel and one child, sustained injuries when the Majeed Brigade launched three coordinated attacks targeting the Frontier Corps Headquarters, the Railway Station and the District Jail in the Mach town of Kachhi District. BLA ‘spokesperson’, Jeeyand Baloch claimed the attack, stating that it was a joint attack in coordination with other factions, during which BLA insurgents controlled Mach city and surrounding areas for over 72 hours.

The growing number of attacks by the insurgent groups are substantially a retaliation to the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of Baloch people by the SF and their proxies. Victims of enforced disappearances include political workers, journalists, human rights defenders, and students. According to the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) report of December 2023, more than 7,000 persons have gone ‘missing’ from Balochistan since 2000. However, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances formed in 2011 with the objective of tracing the missing persons and fixing responsibility on the individuals or organisations responsible for it, posted data on its website claiming that there were just 454 ‘active cases’ of enforced disappearances from Balochistan, as of October 2023. 

Normal life in Balochistan for quite some time has been immensely uncertain as the Government continues its tradition of using force to suppress peaceful protests. Since July 27, there has been a standoff between the Government and Baloch protesters at multiple locations. Rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, and protests are ongoing in various parts of Balochistan despite crackdowns by the Government. The protests began after the Government blocked the main highways in Balochistan the day before a political gathering organized by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC, Baloch Unity Committee) was scheduled to take place in Gwadar. The Baloch Raji Machi (Baloch National Gathering) organized by the BYC started on July 28, 2024, in Gwadar. On 27 July, the Frontier Corps (FC) fired at people travelling to join the Baloch protests, injuring at least 14. Blockades were created across the province to restrict freedom of movement and an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, banning all public assemblies of four or more people, was imposed in the provincial capital, Quetta. On July 28, at least three protestors were killed by SFs, in Gwadar and Talar, and dozens were injured. On July 29, the Police used tear gas to disperse protesters. Several organizers, along with dozens of protesters, were detained, including Sammi Deen Baloch, Sabghatullah Shah and Dr. Sabiha Baloch. 

The heavy-handed State crackdown, resulting in multiple deaths, dozens of injuries, and the detention of nearly a thousand BYC supporters, has sparked further and widespread protests across Balochistan. Thousands of people have taken to the streets in cities, including Quetta, Khuzdar, Kharan, Kalat, and Dalbandin, demanding the release of detained activists and an end to ‘state violence.’ In Quetta, large crowds protested against what they described as ‘state violence’ against peaceful participants of the ‘Baloch National Gathering.’ In Dalbandin, Police attempted to disperse protesters demonstrating against the use of force, provoking the crowd to pelt stones, leading to the Police opening fire. Residents of Kharan had gathered to express solidarity with the participants of the ‘Baloch Raaji Muchi.’ In Khuzdar, Security Forces cordoned off and blocked BYC’s protest rally, raising concerns of another crackdown. These actions have led to road blockades and shutter-down strikes in many cities, with multiple highways in Balochistan being jammed.

The BYC is a rights group advocating for the civil, political, and socioeconomic rights of the Baloch. It described the Baloch National Gathering as a “referendum against the Baloch genocide, the exploitation of Baloch resources under the guise of so-called megaprojects, and the conversion of Balochistan into a prison under the pretext of security.” However, ISPR Director General (DG) Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry denounced BYC on August 5 and called its “so-called leadership” a “proxy of terrorist organisations and criminal mafias and nothing more than that.” 

Authorities in Balochistan as well as at the Federal level have long adopted the policy of suppressing peaceful political and public protests with an iron hand. For years, protesting families of the victims of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings have faced similar patterns of violence by the security establishment. In one of the many earlier instances, in Gwadar, the authorities had used such tactics to suppress the Haq Do Tehreek (Give our Rights Movement) for basic rights and protection of the livelihoods of local people. 

While the violence in the province has social and developmental causes, the adamant State establishment has chosen exclusively to supress the problem militarily. On August 22, 2024, the Government approved PKR 60 billion to carry out Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Commitment for stability) to fight militancy in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On June 22, the Central Apex Committee on the National Action Plan (NAP), chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, launched the new Army Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. In response, the BLA-led Baloch Raj Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organization of Baloch ‘pro-independence’ groups, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, against Pakistan’s military campaign. In a media release, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan condemned the operation as a blatant intensification of the ongoing ‘genocide’ against the Baloch people. Baloch Khan claimed that the operation, which, according to the official narrative, aims to stabilize and secure Pakistan, is merely a pretext for escalating military aggression in Balochistan. He asserted that BRAS and its allied organizations were prepared to defend their land and people against any form of military action, promising to defeat the ‘invading’ forces.

The unending cycle of retaliatory violence will continue as long as the Pakistani state persists with its policy of endemic marginalisation and neglect of the local population, and the exclusive reliance on military and extra-legal repression. As the central authority in Pakistan weakens progressively, this will prove to be a counter-productive and, eventually, potentially suicidal strategy for the state.
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
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