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Following Jununi’s arrest, as reported on March 21, Maulana Borhan, who previously served as the ‘spokesperson’ of ARSA, was appointed as the ‘acting chief’. Further, on March 20, Maulana Khalid, a key associate of Jununi, released an audio statement urging ARSA cadres to hold their positions and continue their activities: "Our activities will continue in Ataullah's absence. Do not step back. We will move forward with more strength.” Khalid, who is believed to be operating the group's activities from the zero-line with Myanmar, also instructed his followers to monitor their opponents closely.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 50 ARSA-linked incidents of violence have been reported inside Bangladesh between March 2017 and March 30, 2025. At least 69 persons (31 civilians, and 38 militants) have been killed and another 55 (26 civilians and 29 militants) injured in these incidents. It may be recalled that, in March 2017, the Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement) renamed itself ARSA.
ARSA under Jununi’s leadership gained wider notice following their August 25, 2017, attacks on around 30 Police and Army posts in Rakhine province of Myanmar, using mostly knives, aged firearms, farm equipment, and improvised explosive devices. In a YouTube video, uploaded in August, 2017, Jununi stated, “Our primary objective under ARSA is to liberate our people from dehumanized oppression perpetrated by all successive Burmese regimes.”
Born in a refugee camp in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1977, Jununi and his parents moved to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. As reported on March 21, 2025, he was enrolled in an Islamic religious school in Mecca. As a young boy, he worked at a mosque in Saudi Arabia and attended Rohingya community meetings, where his speeches impressed Saudis, who backed his efforts to gain rights for Rohingya Muslims.
The above-mentioned August 25, ARSA’s attack on Police and Army posts, led to the ruthless crackdown by Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) that drove around 740,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. This was the third major exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Earlier waves followed military assaults on the group in 1978 and 1991-1992. As the persecuted Rohingyas took shelter in the refugee camps located in Ukhia and Teknaf sub-Districts in Cox’s Bazar District, ARSA cadres have been continuing their violent activities. Some prominent incidents include:
• March 16, 2025: A youth identified as Habizul Rahman, was beaten and killed by ARSA cadres at an Ukhia camp in Cox's Bazar District.
• May 13, 2024: A Rohingya community leader- "head majhi" of Camp 4, identified as Mohammad Ilias, was shot and killed by ARSA cadres in an Ukhia camp.
• December 21, 2023: Three Rohingya men, including a community leader, were shot and stabbed to death in three refugee camps in the Ukhiya upazila (sub-district) of Cox's Bazar District, by ARSA operatives. The deceased were identified as Mohammad Abdullah, a resident of Block C of Balukhali Camp 17, and Nadir Hossain, head majhi (chief community leader) of Block F of Madhurchhara Camp 4, and Master Aiub, 35, a resident of Bhasanchar refugee Camp. .
• November 14, 2022: Bangladesh Air Force officer, Squadron Leader Rizwan Rushdee, who was posted at the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), was killed and several RAB members were injured by suspected ARSA cadres during an 'anti-smuggling drive' on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border.
• September 29, 2022: Mohib Ullah, the chairman of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, who advocated repatriation, was shot dead. Soon after the murder, Mohib's brother Habib Ullah claimed that ARSA, locally known as Al-Yaqin, was behind the assassination.
• October 22, 2021: Armed ARSA cadres killed six men, including a teacher, inside Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama Al-Islamiyah Madrasa, in Camp-18 in Balukhali. ARSA wanted to set up a training centre at the madrasa.
As reported on March 21, 2025, more than 1.3 million Rohingyas reside in 33 refugee camps in Ukhia and Teknaf. The number of ARSA cadres within the Rohingya camps have also increased, as the group projects itself as the ethno-nationalist defender and liberator of the Rohingya people. In November, 2024, it was reported that between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters are recruited by Rohingya armed groups in the camps. According to March 24, 2025, report, the cadre strength of ARSA is estimated to be 5,000. Also, some 30,000 children are born each year in these camps, where violence and crime are widespread, significantly increasing the potential recruitment pool. The cadres are recruited through drives using ideological, nationalist, and financial inducements, coupled with false promises, threats, and coercion. The group has long used the communication platform WhatsApp to recruit and communicate with its cadres while also using social media platforms Facebook and X for its public messaging.
Harakah al-Yaqin was formed in 2012 following lethal riots between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims that year, which killed some 200 people and displaced over 120,000, almost all of them Muslims. Since then, Harakah al-Yaqin obtained fatwas from clerics in countries with a significant Rohingya Diaspora, to justify the use of violence against the Myanmar Armed Forces, and it has carried out significant attacks on Security Forces, including multiple coordinated attacks on October 9, 2016, which resulted in the deaths of nine Police Officers in Maungdaw Township of Rakhine province. The former Myanmar government and military responded with massive military retaliation, attacking Rohingya civilians in approximately 40 villages in Maungdaw Township and displacing more than 94,000 people, many of whom fled to Bangladesh. Later in 2017, Harakah al-Yaqin renamed itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).
Bangladesh is trying to contain possible advances of the Arakan Army (AA), by weaponizing both ARSA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). AA was established in April 2009 in the border area between Myanmar and China. It’s declared objective is “the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan sovereignty to the people of Arakan.” The Rohingya and the AA never had a comfortable relationship, let alone close ties. While both sporadically experienced atrocities and suppressions by Myanmar’s Security Forces under the pretext of counterinsurgency operations, they rarely joined forces. The Rohingya harboured significant suspicions towards the AA, mainly due to the Muslim-Buddhist religious divide in Rakhine state. Predominantly Muslim, the Rohingya view the largely Buddhist AA as part of the dominant Bamar community. The AA, on its part, largely shares the Myanmar government’s narrative that the Rohingyas are migrants and do not belong in Myanmar.
Since the fall of Maungdaw in Rakhine, Myanmar, to AA, in December, 2024, and the worsening situation, Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) met with Rohingya representatives on January 19, to provide weapons and intelligence gathering training at the 1W refugee camp of Ukhia. The ethno-religious mistrust between Rohingyas and AA is used as a pretext by the Bangladeshi establishment to train and weaponize Rohingya gangs to fight a future AA intrusion into Bangladesh’s territory. The meeting was attended by representatives of arch rivals ARSA and RSO. DGFI initiated “specialised” guerrilla warfare training for select groups of Rohingya refugees living in the Kutupalong area of Cox’s Bazar as part of a broader strategy to counter potential attacks by AA. Weaponizing a radicalised population and training Rohingya insurgent groups had an inevitable boomerang effect on the security situation in Bangladesh, adding to the chaos, since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August, 2024.
The Rohingya refugee camps have become dens of violence. Out of 11 known active armed Rohingya groups, the most prominent is ARSA, active in the camps of Ukhia, Palongkhali, Balukhali, and Whykong. It often faces a backlash from other groups competing for their own position, including RSO, as well as the Master Munna Group (both active in Ukhia and Palongkhali), and the Nobi Hossain Group, active in the Whykong Camp. RSO was initially active between 1982 to 1998. The group began to re-emerge in Bangladesh in 2021, with support from Bangladeshi security agencies. The Master Munna Group is an armed criminal group known for its links to drug trafficking. The Nobi Hussain Group also calls itself the Arakan Rohingya Army, but is an armed criminal group focused mostly on drug trafficking. Nobi Hossain is opposed to ARSA and nominally aligned with RSO. In the meantime, the Islami Mahaj Group, active in the Whykong camp, also seeks to recruit members through its Islamist agenda. Other groups include: the Chakma robber gang, Putia robber gang, Zakir robber gang, Salman Shah robber gang, Khaleque robber gang, and Jabu robber gang – all active in Whykong camp.
ARSA is trying to carve out its own zone of dominance through various criminal activities. In the current circumstances with the lurking danger of AA on the other side of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and the instability within Bangladesh, innocent Rohingya refugees face the brunt of the violence. Jununi’s arrest is unlikely to deter the continuing disorders in the Rohingya camps and along the border with Myanmar.
