The board of directors of Barrick Gold has launched a comprehensive review of all aspects of the Reko Diq project, the centerpiece of Pakistan's mining strategy and one of the world's largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits, located in Balochistan province. CEO Mark Hill said that “growing security concerns” prompted the board to re-examine the entire investment plan. Politically and geopolitically, the decision represents a significant setback for Islamabad. In recent months, the Pakistani government had presented Reko Diq as a strategic lever in its relations with Washington, offering the Trump administration the possibility of accessing Balochistan's resources in exchange for financial and military aid. Barrick Gold's announcement undermines this narrative and, above all, once again calls into question Islamabad's ability to guarantee stability for investments considered crucial. Not only that, but the Canadian group's move is a resounding strategic victory for the Baloch Liberation Army. Barrick's announcement follows the launch of Operation Herof 2, formally presented as a continuation of Herof 1, which in August 2024 had struck numerous Pakistani military posts throughout the province. In reality, Herof 2 is much more than that and marks a decisive change in strategy in the Baloch uprising. Herof 1 had confirmed the organizational growth of the BLA, but remained within the classic logic of guerrilla warfare: strike, disorient, retreat. With Herof 2, the strategy has changed. The operation simultaneously involved at least a dozen cities and districts, including Quetta, Noshki, Gwadar, Kech, Kalat, Dalbandin, and Panjgur, covering an estimated area of over 100,000 square kilometers, about one-third of the entire Balochistan. In several locations, armed groups remained operational for hours, in some cases for days, striking not only military targets but also prisons, administrative offices, Counter Terrorism Department headquarters, and intelligence-related facilities. This sent a clear political message: Balochistan is not, or is no longer, a rebellious periphery to be contained, but an occupied territory in revolt. And the BLA has demonstrated not only that it can affect the functioning of the state but also that it enjoys a significant degree of support from the local population. The case of Noshki is emblematic: the city was the scene of clashes that lasted four days and a temporary paralysis of the civil and police administration. Beyond the conflicting versions of losses and effective control of the territory, the politically relevant fact is the shift of the conflict to the urban and symbolic space of the state. The goal was not to ‘hold’ the territory in a military sense, but to demonstrate that state authority can be suspended, even if only temporarily. This shift reflects a deeper transformation of the insurgency. Herof 2 has the characteristics of a full-fledged military operation: the Bla no longer appears as a constellation of rebel cells, but as a real military structure with specialized units, intelligence capabilities, and operational coordination. The combined use of assault teams, intelligence, and suicide bombers indicates a desire to raise the strategic cost of the conflict for Islamabad, making a management strategy based exclusively on repression and militarization of the region increasingly unsustainable. The geographical dimension reinforces this interpretation. Noshki is located near Reko Diq, the Saindak gold mines, and the border area with Iran and Afghanistan. In statements released during and after the operations, the BLA explicitly warned Pakistani and foreign companies to suspend their activities in the region. It argued that international companies are not neutral actors, but instruments of state control over the territory. From this perspective, foreign investments become legitimate targets not so much for their immediate economic value, but for their political and symbolic significance. The signal goes beyond the individual mining project. It indicates that the instability of Balochistan is taking on a structural character, with potential repercussions on global supply chains and regional economic balances. The same applies to Gwadar, the hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, where the attacks have once again reinforced Beijing's doubts about the long-term sustainability of its commitments in the region. Herof 2, therefore, is not just a military operation, but a strategic statement. The Baloch uprising seems to want to move beyond the dimension of low-intensity, manageable, and marginal conflict to establish itself as a political and geopolitical factor. This does not imply a conventional capacity to challenge the Pakistani state, whose military superiority remains overwhelming. But it does signal that Islamabad's strategy, based almost exclusively on coercion, is showing increasingly obvious cracks. In the medium to long term, Pakistan's ability to attract and retain foreign capital in Balochistan will depend on its willingness to recognize a basic fact: a population that no longer accepts being ruled as an internal colony. Continuing to take refuge in the tired narrative of “external actors” fomenting “terrorism” in Balochistan may provide a reassuring explanation for partners and allies, but it does not change the reality on the ground. As long as Islamabad insists on this convenient fiction, avoiding recognition that the problem is political and internal, any investment will remain vulnerable by definition. And as long as the instability in Balochistan continues to produce measurable geopolitical effects, the BLA will be able to claim that it has done what the state has failed to do: transform an ignored periphery into a strategic hub.