Opeeration Herof 2
But on the ground in Balochistan, a very different narrative has taken hold.
The Baloch Liberation Army immediately rejected the Army’s claims, stating that its own Operation Herof 2.0—“Black Storm”—was not only ongoing but entering its sixth consecutive day with sustained momentum. In statements issued through its spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch, the group dismissed the military’s declaration as propaganda designed to mask setbacks. According to the BLA, the battlefield reality tells a story of coordinated insurgent advances, widespread attacks, and a province far from pacified.
Operation Radd-ul-Fitna began with reported Security Forces raids in Harnai and Panjgur, where 30 and 11 insurgents were killed respectively. Islamabad framed the campaign as a crackdown on insurgent hideouts and sleeper cells. Yet what followed was not insurgent collapse, but escalation. At dawn on January 31, the BLA launched Phase 2 of Operation Herof, unleashing coordinated attacks across 14 districts, including Quetta, Nushki, Mastung, Gwadar, Turbat, Panjgur, Kharan, and Kech.
The scale marked a shift. Rather than isolated hit-and-run strikes, the insurgents executed synchronized operations at 48 locations. Government spokesperson Shahid Rind confirmed that multiple sites had been targeted, even while claiming they were “foiled.” The BLA asserted that dozens of military posts were overrun, over 30 government buildings were set ablaze, and more than 23 Security Forces vehicles were destroyed. It claimed that 84 personnel from the Army, Frontier Corps, Police, CTD, and intelligence agencies were killed in the early phase, with additional casualties mounting in subsequent days.
Most intense has been the fighting in Nushki. Reports from the ground indicate attacks on Frontier Corps headquarters, CTD installations, administrative offices, and security camps. Nushki is not an incidental target. It lies near the Saindak and Reko Diq mineral projects—sites of enormous gold and copper reserves that sit at the intersection of Baloch land, foreign corporate interests, and Islamabad’s economic ambitions. A Chinese firm operates Saindak; a Canadian company is engaged at Reko Diq. For many Baloch nationalists, these projects symbolize extraction without representation, wealth removed while local communities remain marginalized.
Operation Herof carries political symbolism beyond its tactical footprint. The BLA’s leadership, including its commander-in-chief Bashir Zeb Baloch, released footage urging Baloch men and women to join what he described as a decisive struggle to expel what he termed the “Punjabi state” from Balochistan. Whether one agrees with the rhetoric or not, it reflects a deep reservoir of grievance rooted in decades of enforced disappearances, militarization, and contested resource control.
One of the most striking elements of Herof 2.0 has been the participation of female fidayeen. The BLA identified Hawa Baloch alias Droshum and Asifa Mengal among those involved. Hawa Baloch appeared in combat footage released by the group, reportedly filmed hours before her death, urging resistance. Asifa Mengal was said to have carried out a vehicle-borne attack targeting an intelligence facility in Nushki. The deployment of women in frontline and suicide operations marks a dramatic evolution in insurgent tactics and signals the depth of mobilization within segments of Baloch society.
The Army, for its part, insists that Radd-ul-Fitna achieved its objectives. Yet even as Islamabad declared victory, clashes continued to be reported in multiple districts. The BLA claimed 280 Security Forces personnel had been killed across engagements, while acknowledging 35 of its own fighters had fallen, including members of the Majeed Brigade, the Fateh Squad, and the Special Tactical Operations Squad. Independent verification of casualty figures on either side remains difficult, but the persistence of fighting undermines the image of a swift, clean victory.
In what has become a familiar pattern, Pakistan’s leadership quickly attributed the unrest to external sponsorship. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif accused India of orchestrating the insurgency through proxies. Such allegations serve a domestic narrative, but they also risk obscuring the internal drivers of conflict: political exclusion, contested autonomy, and longstanding resentment over resource governance.
For many in Balochistan, Operation Herof 2.0 is framed not as terrorism, but as resistance. Islamabad labels it insurgency and militancy; Baloch nationalists describe it as defense of the motherland. The language reflects a deeper divide over sovereignty, identity, and economic justice.
What is clear is that the conflict has entered a new phase. The BLA’s coordinated urban operations, its ability to strike strategic districts simultaneously, and its willingness to escalate symbolically through female fidayeen indicate a structured and evolving military posture. The battlefield is no longer confined to remote hills; it now intersects with economic corridors, mineral hubs, and international investments.
The Pakistani Army’s declaration that Operation Radd-ul-Fitna has ended rings premature against the backdrop of ongoing clashes. Victory declared from a podium does not equate to stability on the ground. If anything, Operation Herof 2.0 demonstrates that the insurgency remains adaptive, organized, and capable of projecting force across wide swaths of Balochistan.
Until the political roots of the conflict are addressed—through genuine autonomy, equitable resource sharing, and accountability for human rights abuses—military operations alone are unlikely to produce lasting peace. In Balochistan today, the smoke has not cleared. It has thickened.
