The month of March 2026 marked a sharp escalation in the shadow war unfolding across Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province, as insurgent groups intensified their targeted campaign against individuals accused of operating within state-backed militias—widely described by critics as nothing more than organized networks of ordinary criminals functioning under official protection.

A series of coordinated and intelligence-driven attacks by groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) underscored both the persistence and evolution of this violent confrontation.

Throughout March, the pattern was consistent. On March 24, unidentified gunmen—suspected Baloch insurgents—killed two alleged militia operatives in Panjgur District. A week earlier, on March 17, BLF cadres killed three such operatives and captured another in Washuk District, accusing them of running an illegal checkpoint along the CPEC highway, where they extorted money from civilians. Subsequent operations on March 12, March 6, and March 4 similarly targeted individuals accused of acting as informants, collaborators, or participants in coercive activities against local communities.

By the end of the month, at least eight such figures had been eliminated. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 12 members of these militias were killed in seven attacks during the first quarter of 2026—an increase compared to previous years and part of a broader resurgence in insurgent activity.

While often described in official or neutral language as “pro-government militias” or “death squads,” these groups are widely regarded by local communities, activists, and independent observers as criminal enterprises. Far from being disciplined auxiliary forces, they are frequently accused of engaging in extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and targeted violence against civilians. Their operations are not limited to counterinsurgency; rather, they function as predatory networks that exploit the conflict environment for profit and power.

Insurgent organizations such as the Baloch Liberation Army have repeatedly framed their attacks as retaliation against what they describe as criminal collaborators embedded within the state’s security architecture. High-profile killings in 2025—including those of Shakir Saadullah Langove and Muawiya Jamaldini—were justified on the grounds that these individuals led networks responsible for harassment, extrajudicial killings, and illicit economic activities.

The characterization of these militias as ordinary criminals is reinforced by the range of allegations against them. They are accused of running protection rackets, establishing unauthorized checkpoints to extort travelers, operating private detention facilities, and participating in enforced disappearances. In many cases, they are said to include individuals with prior criminal backgrounds who have been co-opted into counterinsurgency roles, effectively granting them impunity in exchange for loyalty.

Human rights organizations point to their central role in one of the most troubling aspects of the conflict: enforced disappearances. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons estimates that around 7,000 individuals are missing in Balochistan, while the Human Rights Council of Balochistan documented 1,455 cases in 2025 alone. Many of these cases are attributed, at least in part, to the activities of these militias acting in coordination with or on behalf of state forces. Victims are often abducted without warrants, held incommunicado, and in some cases later found dead—fueling allegations of a systematic “kill-and-dump” policy.

The historical roots of these networks further complicate their image. One of the earliest and most prominent figures linked to their emergence is Shafiq-ur-Rehman Mengal, who reportedly established the Musallah Defah Tanzeem (MDT) in 2008. His group has been associated with widespread violence and criminality, including the discovery of mass graves in Tootak in 2014. Over time, similar groups proliferated across Balochistan, often led by local strongmen who combined political influence with coercive power.

Rather than dismantling these networks, recent developments suggest a degree of political normalization. Reports indicate that the Pakistan People's Party, under the leadership of President Asif Ali Zardari, has sought to integrate figures associated with these militias into formal political structures. Critics argue that this move effectively legitimizes actors widely accused of criminal conduct, further entrenching their influence.

At the same time, the state has continued to expand its security footprint. The March 17 decision to deploy 3,000 Federal Constabulary personnel to the province reflects a strategy focused on coercion and control rather than addressing underlying grievances. For many observers, the coexistence of formal security forces and informal criminal militias blurs the line between law enforcement and lawlessness.

This convergence has profound consequences. As insurgent groups escalate attacks against these actors, and as the state continues to rely—directly or indirectly—on such networks, the cycle of violence deepens. Civilians remain caught in the middle, facing threats not only from armed insurgents but also from groups they perceive as criminal entities operating with impunity.

In this context, the label “death squad” may obscure more than it reveals. For many in Balochistan, these are not merely auxiliary forces in a counterinsurgency campaign, but entrenched criminal organizations whose actions have contributed significantly to the province’s enduring instability and human rights crisis.