Sikh
Italian authorities have released limited information, but investigators are reportedly examining whether the attack was a targeted and carefully planned execution. Three Indian nationals from the Sikh community are said to be under investigation. Local accounts, citing witnesses, have suggested that the shooter may have been an Indian national from Antegnate and a frequent visitor to the same gurudwara. One of the victims, Rajinder Singh, had previously served as president of a Sikh cultural association and was involved in the management of the gurudwara before stepping down at the end of 2025. Reports indicate that he had been engaged in a dispute with a rival faction over control of the institution.
While the motive remains officially unconfirmed, the incident appears to fit into a broader pattern: gurudwaras in parts of Europe and North America are increasingly becoming sites of factional rivalry, financial contestation, political mobilisation and, in some cases, violence. What were historically centres of faith, service and community life are, in a small but significant number of cases, being drawn into struggles over money, influence, identity and ideological control.
Less than 72 hours after the Covo killings, another violent incident took place at Gurudwara Singh Sabha in Moers, near Duisburg, Germany. At least 11 people were injured in a clash reportedly involving more than 40 persons. Preliminary accounts suggest the confrontation occurred between current and former sevadars over control of the gurudwara’s golak, or donation box. Witnesses described the use of pepper spray, knives and kirpans, while cartridge cases were also reportedly recovered, indicating that a firearm or blank-firing weapon may have been discharged. At least one suspect was later arrested.
Taken together, the Italy and Germany incidents point to a wider problem: the politicisation and criminalisation of diaspora religious spaces. The issue is not the Sikh community, whose mainstream remains overwhelmingly law-abiding and rooted in traditions of seva, faith and community solidarity. Rather, the concern lies with fringe networks that exploit religious institutions for power, money and political messaging.
This pattern is not new. In September 2025, four people were injured in a clash at a gurudwara in Novellara, Italy, reportedly involving Nihangs and pro-Khalistan activists linked in reports to Sikhs For Justice. The dispute began over the display of traditional weapons during Dussehra festivities but escalated into a broader confrontation involving accusations of corruption and political disloyalty. In July 2025, a protest at Gurudwara Sahib in Leamington Spa and Warwick in the United Kingdom disrupted a proposed mixed-faith Anand Karaj ceremony. In January 2025, Bakhtawar Singh Bajwa, also known as Balora, was killed during a dispute at a gurudwara in Vilvoorde, Belgium, amid reported rivalry between pro-Khalistan factions over management control.
Earlier incidents show that the phenomenon has deeper roots. In 2018, Sikh preacher Amrik Singh Chandigarh was assaulted at Sri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara in Southall, London, reportedly over doctrinal disagreements. The 2009 attack at Guru Ravidass Gurudwara in Vienna, in which Sant Ramanand Dass was killed and several others injured, remains one of the most serious examples of diaspora religious violence. That attack, rooted in caste and religious protocol disputes, triggered unrest in Punjab and demonstrated how conflicts within diaspora institutions can reverberate back into India.
The recurring theme in many of these cases is control. Gurudwaras are not only religious institutions; they are also centres of community authority. Control over a gurudwara can bring access to donations, event funding, community networks, political legitimacy and influence over diaspora narratives. In competitive factional environments, management elections and committee disputes can become zero-sum contests. Where extremist politics and criminal networks overlap, intimidation and violence can follow.
The Khalistan question has intensified this dynamic. In recent years, small but assertive pro-Khalistan groups have expanded their activities across Western countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, France and Portugal. These activities include referendum-style campaigns, demonstrations, diplomatic confrontations, online propaganda and attempts to insert separatist messaging into religious and cultural events. The 2023 attack on the Indian High Commission in London and the arson attack on the Indian consulate in San Francisco reflected this wider pattern of aggressive mobilisation.
At the same time, Western governments face a difficult but essential distinction: Sikh religious practice and lawful political expression must not be conflated with violent extremism. Peaceful advocacy, protest and dissent are protected in liberal democracies. The problem arises when religious or political platforms are allegedly used to promote violence, raise funds for extremist activity, intimidate dissenters, or provide cover for criminal networks.
Canada’s 2025 Public Report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, released on May 1, 2026, is significant in this regard. It places Canada-based Khalistani extremists under the category of Politically Motivated Violent Extremism and states that their continued involvement in violent extremist activity poses a national security threat to Canada and Canadian interests. The report notes that a small number of individuals use Canada as a base to promote, fundraise for, or plan violence, while also exploiting Canadian institutions and unsuspecting community members.
The CSIS report is careful to distinguish peaceful advocacy for Khalistan from violent extremism. This distinction is necessary and legally important. However, it also highlights the grey zone in which extremist actors can operate: between protected expression and operational support for violence. Historically, that space has been difficult for law enforcement agencies to monitor without either underreacting to genuine threats or overreaching into legitimate civil liberties.
Canada’s reassessment is especially notable because of the historical context. The report refers to the 40th anniversary of the 1985 Air India Flight 182 bombing, the deadliest terrorist attack in Canadian history, which killed 329 people, most of them Canadians. By invoking that anniversary, CSIS underscores that Khalistani extremist violence is not merely an Indian concern but has previously inflicted mass casualties on Canada itself.
The Canadian case also illustrates the convergence of separatist politics and organised crime. Recent years have seen a rise in extortion-related shootings, targeted killings and gang-linked violence involving Punjab-origin criminal networks. The killing of Simranjit Singh, also known as Sam Canada, in Surrey in May 2026, reportedly linked by investigators to possible Khalistan-related angles and gang rivalries, reflects the increasingly blurred line between political extremism and criminal enterprise. The March 2026 killing of Punjabi-origin social media influencer Nancy Grewal, an outspoken critic of Khalistani extremism, has further deepened concerns, though investigations remain ongoing.
India has long argued that Canada has provided a permissive environment for Khalistani and Punjab-origin criminal networks. According to Indian agencies, several wanted gangster-terrorist figures have operated from Canadian soil, and multiple extradition requests remain pending. Canada, for its part, continues to raise concerns over alleged Indian foreign interference and transnational repression, particularly after the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey. The result is a dual framing: Canada now acknowledges the domestic security threat posed by violent Khalistani extremism, while still scrutinising India’s alleged methods of countering it.
Europe is increasingly facing similar pressures. Italy’s Punjabi migrant population, particularly in agricultural regions, has grown substantially over the years. Alongside legitimate labour migration and community formation, reports have also pointed to organised criminal clusters involved in labour exploitation and illicit activities. Indian investigations into targeted killings in Punjab in 2016 and 2017 alleged that some individuals involved were based in Italy, with funds transferred from Italy, Australia and the UK through wire transfers and hawala channels.
This ecosystem is further complicated by the alleged role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, which Indian assessments have long accused of exploiting diaspora networks to sustain low-intensity destabilisation against India. By using ideological proxies, criminal intermediaries and transnational networks, external actors can amplify separatist activity while maintaining plausible deniability.
The politicisation of religious events adds another layer of risk. Nagar Kirtans and Vaisakhi processions remain primarily devotional and community-oriented. Yet in some Western cities, these events have increasingly featured separatist flags, posters and messaging. In Canada, Vaisakhi celebrations in April 2026 reportedly included prominent displays marking the 40th anniversary of the Khalistan movement and commemorating Hardeep Singh Nijjar. In New Zealand, reports from December 2025 suggested that overt political messaging during Sikh processions provoked backlash from right-wing groups and contributed to anti-Sikh rhetoric.
This is perhaps the most damaging consequence of extremist mobilisation: the costs are borne by the Sikh mainstream. Visible extremism, diplomatic confrontations, vandalism, intimidation and violence risk fuelling anti-Sikh prejudice. They also distort the public image of a community whose religious traditions are grounded in equality, service and resilience.
The challenge before Western governments is therefore not simply one of policing isolated crimes. It is to understand the institutional ecosystem in which violence emerges. Gurudwara-linked disputes are often about much more than local management. They can involve transnational ideological networks, financial flows, criminal enforcement, foreign intelligence interests, diaspora politics and competing claims over Sikh identity.
For India, the challenge lies in sustaining intelligence cooperation and diaspora outreach without overreach. Heavy-handed or poorly calibrated responses can alienate Sikh communities and feed the very narratives that extremists exploit. For Western governments, the priority must be to distinguish legitimate religious and political expression from violence, coercion and criminal financing. That requires better financial investigations, closer monitoring of extremist-criminal networks, stronger enforcement of existing terrorist entity designations, and deeper engagement with mainstream Sikh institutions.
For the Sikh diaspora, the question is even more fundamental. Will gurudwaras remain spaces of worship, service and community solidarity, or will a small number be captured by factional, separatist and criminal agendas? The answer will depend not only on law enforcement, but also on the willingness of community leaders to isolate coercive actors, protect institutional transparency and resist the weaponisation of faith for political violence.
The recent incidents in Italy, Germany and Canada should not be treated as disconnected episodes. They point to a structural problem: the convergence of extremist ideology, organised crime and contested control over diaspora institutions. Unless this nexus is disrupted, cycles of intimidation and violence are likely to continue, damaging Sikh community cohesion, Western domestic security and India’s national interests alike.
The solution is not suspicion of the Sikh diaspora. It is precisely the opposite: partnership with the Sikh mainstream to reclaim gurudwaras from those who would turn them into battlegrounds. Only by separating faith from extremism, community leadership from criminal control, and political expression from violent mobilisation can gurudwaras across the West remain what they were meant to be: spaces of devotion, dignity and harmony.
