Jammu security
Recent incidents along the Line of Control (LoC) illustrate this pattern with clarity. On the night of March 14–15, Indian Security Forces (SFs) foiled an infiltration attempt in the Uri sector of Baramulla District, killing one Pakistani militant. Just days earlier, on March 10, another infiltration bid in Rajouri District was thwarted, leaving one militant dead and another injured. These were not isolated episodes but part of a sustained effort by Pakistan-backed groups to push armed operatives into Indian territory.
The involvement of Pakistan-based organisations is well established. Groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) continue to play a central role in these infiltration attempts. In February alone, multiple JeM operatives were neutralised in separate encounters across J&K, including a senior commander, Saifullah, in Kishtwar District. Additional militants linked to the group were killed in Udhampur and Kathua, further underscoring the foreign origin of much of the militant presence in the Union Territory.
According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, at least 10 militant-related fatalities have been recorded in J&K so far in 2026. Most of these occurred during counter-infiltration operations or targeted engagements with Pakistan-based operatives. The resulting SF-to-militant kill ratio stands at 1:10—an overwhelming advantage for Indian forces and a significant improvement over early 2025, when militants briefly held the upper hand.
This shift reflects the growing effectiveness of India’s counter-terrorism strategy. Enhanced intelligence gathering, improved surveillance systems, and better coordination between security agencies have enabled SFs to detect and neutralise infiltration attempts with increasing precision. Losses among Indian personnel have been minimal, with only one fatality recorded so far this year despite multiple engagements.
Equally significant is the absence of civilian casualties in 2026 to date. This marks a notable departure from previous years and highlights the extent to which violence has been contained. The last major civilian attack—the April 22, 2025, massacre in Pahalgam, where 26 civilians were killed by Pakistan-backed militants—serves as a stark reminder of the potential consequences when such infiltration efforts succeed.
Long-term data underscores the scale of progress. From the peak of over 4,000 fatalities in 2001, violence in J&K has declined dramatically, reaching just double-digit levels in recent years. This transformation is the result of sustained counter-terrorism operations and effective border management. However, these gains have been achieved despite continued external interference, not because of any reduction in hostile intent across the border.
At the centre of this issue is the enduring role of Pakistan’s security establishment, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI has long been accused of providing training, funding, and logistical support to militant groups operating in J&K. While Pakistan officially denies such involvement, the repeated presence of foreign militants in infiltration attempts tells a different story—one of ongoing state-linked sponsorship of proxy violence.
The contradiction is especially evident in the context of the February 2021 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan. Ceasefire violations have dropped sharply—from hundreds annually to just a single reported incident in 2026. Yet infiltration attempts persist. This suggests a strategic recalibration: instead of overt military escalation, Pakistan-backed networks are increasingly relying on covert means to sustain militancy.
One such adaptation is the growing use of drones. Intelligence reports indicate that drones are being used to transport weapons, ammunition, narcotics, and funds across the LoC and the International Border. This shift allows militant networks to bypass traditional infiltration routes and extend their operational reach without direct crossings, complicating detection and interdiction efforts.
Despite these challenges, the overall militant footprint in J&K has diminished significantly. Current estimates suggest that around 90 militants remain active, the majority of them foreign nationals. The sharp decline in local recruitment further weakens the internal base of militancy, reinforcing the assessment that the threat is increasingly externally driven.
However, the danger has not disappeared. The ability of small, well-trained groups to carry out high-impact attacks remains a serious concern, as demonstrated by past incidents. Moreover, emerging linkages between networks in J&K and attacks elsewhere in India—such as the November 2025 blast near Delhi’s Red Fort—highlight the broader national security implications of Pakistan-backed militancy.
While the security situation has improved, the political dimension remains unresolved. The continued delay in restoring full statehood to J&K has created uncertainty and limited avenues for democratic engagement. Without a parallel political process, even the most effective security measures may struggle to deliver lasting stability.
Nevertheless, the central conclusion is difficult to avoid. The decline in violence in J&K is the result of sustained and effective Indian counter-terrorism efforts. The persistence of the threat, however reduced, is directly linked to Pakistan’s continued support for militant proxies. As long as this support endures, infiltration attempts and the risk of renewed escalation will remain.
A durable peace in J&K will ultimately depend not only on maintaining strong security measures but also on addressing the external drivers of conflict. Without a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s approach—away from proxy militancy and toward genuine non-interference—the region’s hard-won stability will remain fragile.
