islamism on the rise
Since the December 2025 election announcement and the subsequent victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led alliance, attacks against its members have become both frequent and alarmingly brutal. These are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader pattern of intimidation and coercion.
On April 6, a BNP youth activist was attacked in Chittagong, his wrist severed in a gruesome act clearly intended to terrorize. Just days earlier, on April 2, a student wing member was hacked to death in Pabna. On March 31, gunmen targeted the home of a local BNP leader in Chittagong, with reports linking the attack to individuals associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat). Other incidents—arson attacks on party offices, beatings of local leaders, and shootings inside homes—paint a consistent picture of systematic violence.
According to the Institute for Conflict Management, at least nine BNP members and affiliates have been killed and around 80 injured since the election date was declared. This level of sustained targeting points to organized aggression rather than spontaneous unrest.
At the center of this escalation is the growing influence of Jamaat-e-Islami. Once politically constrained, the party has re-emerged as a major force, securing 68 parliamentary seats and establishing itself as the principal opposition. However, its rise is not simply electoral—it is ideological, confrontational, and increasingly aggressive.
The dispute over the July Charter has become the focal point of this confrontation. Approved by a large majority in the February 2026 referendum, the Charter proposes sweeping constitutional reforms. The BNP government, led by Tarique Rahman, has expressed support for reform but insists on following established constitutional procedures rather than implementing the Charter wholesale.
Jamaat has seized on this position to intensify its campaign against the government. Through rallies, public mobilization, and highly charged rhetoric, it has accused the BNP of betraying the will of the people. Senior leaders have gone further, framing the issue in absolutist and religious terms, portraying political disagreement as moral betrayal.
This shift is deeply concerning. The increasing fusion of religion and political mobilization is creating an environment where compromise becomes impossible and violence becomes normalized. When political disputes are cast in ideological or religious terms, opponents are no longer seen as rivals but as enemies to be eliminated or silenced.
The roots of this problem lie partly in the preceding interim period, during which Islamist groups were able to expand their networks with minimal restraint. That momentum has not only persisted but is now being actively leveraged to reshape the political landscape.
The BNP government now faces a dual challenge: protecting its members from targeted violence while also managing the growing pressure from an emboldened Islamist opposition. This is not simply a matter of political competition—it is a test of whether the state can maintain order and uphold democratic norms in the face of organized extremism.
Bangladesh is at a critical juncture. After months of instability, the expectation was a return to democratic normalization. Instead, the country risks moving toward a more volatile and polarized environment, where ideological hardliners exert increasing influence through both political and violent means.
The direction the country takes will depend heavily on how firmly the current leadership responds. Containing political violence and resisting the normalization of extremist pressure will be essential. Failure to do so risks allowing Islamist hardliners to further entrench themselves, with long-term consequences for governance, stability, and the very character of the Bangladeshi state.
