a precarious position
The backlash has been swift. Demonstrations have erupted in multiple Pakistani cities, including Islamabad and Karachi. Protesters burned and trampled portraits of Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while some carried images of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was reportedly killed in the strikes. In Karachi, demonstrators attempted to storm the U.S. Consulate, prompting clashes with security forces that left at least eleven people dead. Nationwide, more than two dozen people have reportedly died in anti-U.S. and anti-Israel protests in the past week.
For the Sharif government, the unrest exposes the contradictions of Pakistan’s external posture. Islamabad had spent months attempting to rebuild ties with Washington under the Trump administration, hoping to secure economic deals in sectors such as critical minerals and emerging technologies while also strengthening Pakistan’s geopolitical position in South Asia. Yet those overtures now clash with domestic political realities in a country where anti-American sentiment remains deeply entrenched.
Pakistan’s internal dynamics make the situation even more volatile. The country hosts one of the largest Shiite populations outside Iran, estimated at roughly 15 to 20 percent of its population. The killing of Khamenei has therefore generated widespread anger that extends far beyond sectarian lines. Analysts note that the outrage reflects broader resentment toward Western intervention in the region as well as frustration with Pakistan’s own political leadership.
The crisis is also exposing the fragility of Pakistan’s economic position. The country remains heavily dependent on imported energy from the Gulf, and disruptions caused by the regional conflict have already triggered sharp increases in fuel prices. Islamabad now faces the prospect of a severe energy shortage. Officials have acknowledged that crude oil reserves may last less than two weeks, while liquefied natural gas supplies could run out by the end of the month. Emergency austerity measures—including a shortened workweek and expanded remote work—are being considered to conserve dwindling energy stocks.
Yet Pakistan’s strategic predicament extends beyond domestic protests and economic stress. The war has placed Islamabad at the intersection of competing regional alignments that it can no longer easily reconcile.
A central complication is Pakistan’s security partnership with Saudi Arabia. In 2025, the two countries signed a strategic mutual defence agreement under which an attack on one could be treated as an attack on both. The pact reflected decades of military cooperation and the deep economic interdependence between Pakistan and the Gulf monarchies.
That agreement now carries serious implications as Iran launches retaliatory missile and drone strikes against Gulf targets in response to the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Pakistan’s military leadership has already held high-level consultations with Saudi officials regarding Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and the potential activation of mutual defence commitments. Islamabad has also warned Tehran that Pakistan remains bound by its obligations to Riyadh.
This alignment places Pakistan in an increasingly awkward position vis-à-vis Iran, a country with which it shares a long and historically sensitive border. The frontier runs through Balochistan, a region that has long suffered from neglect, militarization and political repression under Pakistani rule.
Instability across the border in Iran raises particular concerns for Islamabad because it could weaken Pakistan’s already tenuous control over the province. Balochistan has experienced a steady resurgence of armed resistance in recent years, with separatist groups expanding their operations against Pakistani military installations and infrastructure. Hundreds of attacks have been recorded in the past year alone, underscoring the deep resentment toward the central government’s exploitation of the region’s natural resources and its heavy-handed security policies.
The province is also central to several high-value resource projects. Foreign-backed mining ventures—particularly gold and copper extraction projects—have drawn renewed international attention. These projects promise substantial profits for Pakistan’s political and military elites while offering little tangible benefit to local Baloch communities, further fueling grievances.
Security analysts warn that turmoil in Iran could create opportunities for militant networks to move more easily across the border, potentially strengthening Baloch resistance groups and further destabilizing Pakistan’s southwestern frontier. From Islamabad’s perspective, any weakening of Iranian border controls could expose the limits of Pakistan’s authority in a region where its writ has always been contested.
At the same time, Pakistan must maintain working relations with the United States. Islamabad is currently engaged in a tense confrontation with Afghanistan, where Pakistani forces have carried out airstrikes on militant targets in recent weeks. Pakistani officials have accused Afghanistan’s Taliban government of supporting armed groups responsible for attacks inside Pakistan. In this dispute, Islamabad has relied in part on diplomatic backing from Washington.
For Pakistan’s leadership, maintaining that support remains strategically important. Yet open alignment with the United States has become increasingly difficult as public anger grows over the war in Iran.
Complicating matters further are Pakistan’s economic dependencies. More than half of the roughly $40 billion in annual remittances sent to Pakistan comes from workers employed in Gulf states. Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting Gulf infrastructure therefore threaten not only regional stability but also a critical pillar of Pakistan’s fragile economy.
The Sharif government has attempted to navigate these contradictions by adopting a carefully calibrated diplomatic stance. Pakistani officials have condemned the attacks on Iran and expressed sympathy for civilian casualties while avoiding direct criticism of the United States. The government insists that maintaining functional ties with Washington remains essential.
But the contradictions inherent in this balancing act are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Pakistan’s leadership must simultaneously manage domestic outrage, preserve strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, maintain cooperation with the United States and prevent instability along its Iranian frontier.
The widening conflict in the Middle East has therefore placed Pakistan in one of the most precarious strategic positions it has faced in years. A state that sought to leverage its relationships with both Washington and the Gulf monarchies now finds itself confronting public unrest at home, energy insecurity and growing instability along its borders.
At the same time, the unfolding crisis exposes deeper structural vulnerabilities within Pakistan itself. In regions like Balochistan—where resentment toward Islamabad’s authority remains profound—any regional upheaval could further weaken the state’s already contested grip.
If hostilities between Iran, the United States and Israel continue to escalate, the pressure on Pakistan to support Saudi Arabia under its defence pact could increase dramatically. Such a development would not only deepen Pakistan’s entanglement in a widening regional war but could also intensify internal fault lines that Islamabad has long struggled to contain.
For now, Pakistan is attempting to maintain its precarious diplomatic tightrope. But the longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is that the balancing act will collapse—exposing the structural fragilities of a state already under strain from economic crisis, political instability and unresolved conflicts on its peripheries.










