the rise of Balen
Preliminary results indicate an overwhelming victory for the RSP. The party secured or led in close to a hundred FPTP constituencies and swept all ten constituencies in Kathmandu Valley. With proportional representation allocations underway, projections suggest the RSP could command well over 150 seats in the 275-member House—comfortably surpassing the majority threshold. By contrast, Nepal’s traditional parties have suffered a dramatic collapse in support. The Nepali Congress (NC) is expected to secure only a few dozen seats, while the CPN-UML and the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) are projected to trail even further behind. The results represent a profound repudiation of the political establishment that has dominated Nepal since the end of the Maoist insurgency in 2006.
At the center of this political upheaval is Balendra Shah—widely known as “Balen”—who is expected to become Prime Minister by late March 2026. At 35, Shah stands on the verge of becoming Nepal’s youngest prime minister. His political journey is unconventional even by the standards of Nepal’s turbulent democracy. Over the past decade he has been known variously as a rapper, engineer, anti-corruption campaigner and independent mayor of Kathmandu. His political rise reflects a generational shift in Nepal’s leadership and a growing impatience among younger voters with the entrenched political class.
Although the election formally delivered a mandate to the RSP, many Nepalis saw the vote as a personal endorsement of Shah himself. “People are saying Balen is a savior for Nepal,” noted political scientist Sanjeev Humagain of Nepal Open University, reflecting the quasi-messianic expectations surrounding his leadership. Shah’s popularity owes much to his ability to connect directly with voters through social media. With millions of followers on Facebook in a country of roughly 30 million people, his online presence dwarfs that of most Nepali politicians and allows him to bypass traditional media channels.
Shah’s appeal draws partly from his outsider persona. As a musician before entering politics, he cultivated an image as a voice of the marginalized and disillusioned. Influenced by artists such as Tupac Shakur and 50 Cent, his lyrics often attacked corruption and inequality while championing ordinary citizens. One of his recent songs expresses solidarity with the millions of Nepalis—many from the southern plains—who migrate abroad in search of work due to limited opportunities at home. The song criticizes those who “sell their integrity” and exploit others for personal gain, themes that resonate strongly in a country where corruption has long been a dominant political grievance.
His personal background also carries symbolic significance. In a nation where political leadership has historically been dominated by elites from the hill regions, Shah is widely regarded as the first prime ministerial contender with strong roots in Madhesh, the lowland region bordering India. Communities from this region, which comprises more than half the country’s population, have often felt marginalized within Nepal’s political structure. Shah’s rise therefore carries both generational and geographic significance.
Yet Shah’s political style has also raised questions about how he will navigate the complexities of national governance. As mayor of Kathmandu, he developed a reputation for decisive and sometimes confrontational leadership. He often acted quickly and challenged bureaucratic norms. In one instance he attempted to demolish a squatter settlement he considered unsightly; in another, he ordered a truck to dump garbage in front of the Department of Roads to protest delays in infrastructure projects. His leadership approach relied heavily on a small circle of trusted aides who worked aggressively to cut through bureaucratic procedures.
Shah’s rhetoric has also been combative. He has frequently criticized the United States, China and India—the three external powers with the greatest influence in Nepal—as well as the country’s traditional political parties. Before joining the RSP earlier this year, he even denounced the party itself, writing on social media that “all politicians, new and old, are thieves.” His willingness to publicly confront institutions and political rivals has helped cement his anti-establishment image but may prove more difficult to sustain once he assumes executive responsibility.
Indeed, the transition from insurgent-style politics to national governance will present significant challenges. Nepal’s political system is structurally fragmented, and even a large parliamentary majority does not guarantee smooth policymaking. While the RSP appears dominant in the lower house, it currently holds no seats in the National Assembly, the upper chamber of parliament. This institutional imbalance could complicate the passage of major legislation and force the new government to negotiate with established parties that remain influential despite their electoral defeat.
Beyond parliamentary arithmetic, the incoming administration will need to consolidate authority across key state institutions. Control of the internal security system—principally the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force—falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs and constitutes a critical lever of political power. Both forces played central roles during the protests of 2025, and maintaining their institutional confidence will be essential for preserving stability.
Equally important is the relationship between the civilian leadership and the Nepal Army. Although constitutionally insulated from day-to-day political influence, the Army remains one of the most powerful and autonomous institutions in the country. Governments traditionally influence its leadership through cabinet recommendations for senior appointments, and the new administration may seek to adjust the upper ranks of the security establishment—particularly if certain officials are perceived as closely aligned with the previous Oli government.
Intelligence coordination is another area likely to attract attention. Nepal’s principal civilian intelligence body, the National Investigation Department (NID), has long faced criticism for limited operational capacity and political interference. Strengthening intelligence oversight and coordination could form part of the RSP’s broader governance agenda, particularly as the government seeks to address emerging threats such as political radicalization, organized crime networks and cross-border trafficking.
The process of political consolidation will also extend to the broader civil administration. Nepal’s federal system, introduced under the 2015 Constitution, distributes authority across seven provinces and hundreds of local governments. Aligning provincial bureaucracies and district administrations with the priorities of the new government will be a complex undertaking. Administrative reshuffles and efforts to impose performance-based oversight may become tools through which the RSP attempts to dismantle long-standing patronage networks associated with older political parties.
Despite their electoral setbacks, Nepal’s traditional parties remain deeply embedded within the country’s political system. The Nepali Congress retains strong organizational networks in rural areas and may emerge as the principal parliamentary opposition. Within the party, leaders such as Gagan Thapa are likely to attempt repositioning the NC as a reformist alternative capable of rebuilding support among urban voters.
The CPN-UML also retains a disciplined cadre structure and a substantial base across rural districts. Under the continuing influence of K. P. Sharma Oli, the party may adopt an assertive parliamentary strategy aimed at exposing governance failures by the new administration. Meanwhile, the Maoist Centre led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal—once the dominant force in Nepal’s post-insurgency politics—faces an increasingly uncertain future. Its shrinking electoral base may push the party toward tactical alliances with other leftist groups or attempts to reposition itself as a mediator between competing political blocs.
Ultimately, the rise of the RSP reflects a broader anti-establishment wave driven largely by younger voters seeking accountability, transparency and effective governance. The 2026 election represents a dramatic rejection of Nepal’s traditional political elites and signals a shift in public expectations from democratic institutions.
Whether this moment leads to genuine political renewal or merely another cycle of instability remains uncertain. Shah’s leadership style—direct, populist and often confrontational—proved highly effective in mobilizing public frustration with the political status quo. Governing the country, however, will require a different skill set. Managing a complex bureaucracy, negotiating with political opponents and maintaining institutional stability will demand compromise and strategic patience.
As political scientist Sanjeev Humagain observed, “We have a lot of problems in Nepal. One man, even Balen, is going to have to learn a lot about compromise, communication and teamwork.” The coming months will therefore test whether Nepal’s newest political phenomenon can transform electoral momentum into durable governance in one of South Asia’s most fragile democratic systems.
