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The BLA’s New Chief Was Trained by the Army He Now Fights
  • Rahman Gul
    Rahman Gul
The Baloch Liberation Army has chosen a former Pakistan Army captain to lead its war against the Pakistani state. On 14 November, the organisation announced the appointment of Rahman Gul, better known as Mureed Baloch, as commander-in-chief. Previously commander of the Majeed Brigade and a member of the Senior Command Council, Gul succeeds Bashir Zeb Baloch, whose departure was announced on 3 November. According to the BLA, the selection was unanimous and endorsed by its leadership and commanders.

The succession brings to the head of the organisation a man associated with the development of its most consequential military capabilities. It also presents Islamabad with an uncomfortable biography: an officer trained within its own security establishment who subsequently turned that experience against it. Pakistan’s army has spent years describing the insurgency principally through the activities of foreign sponsors. Its new adversary at the top of the BLA learned his profession rather closer to home.

The circumstances surrounding Bashir Zeb’s departure remain unclear. The BLA presented the transition as the application of an established constitutional procedure, following a meeting of its highest bodies on 16 October. Command powers passed temporarily to the Senior Command Council, while the organisation stressed that no commander was entitled to remain in office for life. These statements describe how the BLA wishes the succession to be understood; they do not independently establish the absence of internal disagreements.

There is, however, little basis for reading Gul’s appointment as a retreat from the campaign developed under his predecessor. The organisation has elevated the commander of its suicide-attack wing, a figure already embedded in its operational leadership. The available evidence points towards continuity, with the experience accumulated in the Majeed Brigade carried into the organisation’s highest office. Whether that produces changes in the scale or selection of attacks remains to be seen.

Gul’s background helps explain why his rise cannot be reduced to the familiar image of a tribesman recruited into somebody else’s war. Born in Nushki in 1984, he belongs to a prominent Mengal family with longstanding connections to local politics and Baloch nationalism. His father, Mir Muhammad Afzal Mengal, participated in electoral politics, including submitting nomination papers for the provincial assembly constituency of Nushki. The family’s political life extended beyond armed opposition to the state.

On his mother’s side, accounts of his family history connect him to Lawang Khan Mengal, a guerrilla commander during the insurgency of the 1970s, and to Gul Khan Naseer, the poet and progressive politician who served as Balochistan’s education minister. That inheritance brought together constitutional politics, literature and resistance. It places Gul within a longer history of Baloch political mobilisation, rather than explaining his choices as the sudden discovery of a grievance.

His own route initially led into the Pakistani state. After schooling in Nushki and further studies in Quetta, he reportedly obtained a degree from the University of Peshawar. Biographical accounts place his entry into the army in 2002, followed by service with the 19 Frontier Force Regiment and training at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul. His postings reportedly included North and South Waziristan and the Line of Control in Kashmir.

The broad significance of that experience is clear even where the detailed chronology rests on published profiles rather than accessible service records. Gul acquired familiarity with the institution he would later fight: its organisation, its operational habits and the conduct of counterinsurgency. Military training can impart technical competence; it cannot guarantee the political loyalty of the person receiving it.

Accounts place his move into the BLA around 2010, initially in Bolan under Aslam Baloch. His subsequent responsibilities reportedly included training recruits and commanding fighters in Kharan and Kalat. His poetry and political writing describe alienation from the security establishment and identification with Baloch suffering. They are evidence of how he articulated his decision, rather than a complete explanation of his private motives. What emerged was a commander able to combine military experience with the language of nationalist mobilisation.

That combination became increasingly relevant as the BLA changed the reach and character of its operations. The revival of the Majeed Brigade’s campaign from 2018 onwards brought suicide attacks into greater prominence alongside ambushes, assaults on security installations and disruption of transport routes. The purpose was to impose costs beyond an encounter between troops and guerrillas in a remote district, reaching places and interests central to Pakistan’s claims of stability.

Chinese interests became a principal target. For Islamabad and Beijing, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor represents infrastructure, investment and strategic connectivity. For Baloch militants, it represents the consolidation of Pakistani control over resources and territory without Baloch consent. Those competing interpretations cannot be reconciled by describing every new project as development and treating local opposition as a security defect.

The BLA’s attacks have sought to make the political dispute expensive for China. The assault on the Chinese consulate in Karachi in 2018, the suicide bombing at Karachi University’s Confucius Institute in 2022 and the attack on a convoy carrying Chinese engineers near Karachi airport in October 2024 demonstrated the geographical reach of that campaign. Chinese nationals could be targeted well beyond Balochistan, where the projects and grievances supposedly under dispute were concentrated.

Two Chinese engineers were killed in the October 2024 bombing, shortly before Pakistan hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Pakistani police subsequently named Gul among those accused in the case. An allegation in a First Information Report does not establish his individual responsibility, but it confirms that the authorities already regarded him as a significant figure before his elevation to overall command.

These attacks also expose the human cost of a strategy designed to turn commercial and diplomatic relationships into liabilities. Chinese engineers, teachers and other civilians do not become military targets because their government finances projects opposed by an insurgency. Nor does the BLA’s description of people removed from buses as security personnel settle their identities. Reporting on such killings has identified civilian victims; the organisation’s claims require scrutiny rather than automatic acceptance.

The strategic logic nevertheless extends beyond the casualties of individual attacks. Railway sabotage and highway blockades challenge the state’s ability to keep transport functioning, while attacks in Karachi carry the conflict into Pakistan’s economic centre. Together, these operations undermine the promise that infrastructure can deliver secure connectivity while the political conflict surrounding it remains unresolved. A corridor requires more than construction contracts and armed escorts.

Gul’s appointment therefore raises two related questions for Islamabad. The first concerns the BLA’s capacity to reproduce leadership and preserve operational knowledge. An organisation that can move a senior commander into its highest office may prove harder to weaken through the loss or removal of individual leaders. The BLA’s public account of an orderly transition is partly a claim to precisely that resilience, although its durability must still be tested.

The second concerns the political conditions in which that capacity develops. Gul’s career runs through institutions often presented as separate worlds: a politically active Baloch family, a Pakistani university, the army, nationalist literature and an armed insurgency. His trajectory does not establish that rebellion was inevitable. It does challenge the assumption that participation in state institutions necessarily resolves the conflict over belonging, authority and control of Balochistan’s resources.

Islamabad now faces a BLA led by a man whose military education it helped provide and whose nationalist convictions it failed to displace. Beijing faces a leadership succession that offers no evidence of an end to the campaign against its interests. Both may respond with more security measures. Neither has yet explained how guarding projects more heavily will produce the political consent that their conception of development continues to take for granted.

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