drug peddlers
The case provides more than a parallel between two troubled border regions. It describes a connection. Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab are not simply confronting similar problems on separate stretches of the frontier; in some investigations, they appear as parts of the same commercial and security network. A consignment can enter through one territory, find buyers in another and produce money useful to actors whose interests extend beyond either.
That is the significance behind the figures presented by Kashmir Zone Inspector General of Police Sujit Kumar on 5 November. For the first ten months of 2026, he reported 1,651 cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1,941 arrests and more than 1,711 kilograms of contraband seized. Police also reported attaching properties worth approximately Rs154 crore and freezing hundreds of bank accounts. The scale demonstrates substantial enforcement activity. Whether it demonstrates a shrinking narcotics economy is another question.
Punjab offers a warning against confusing those two propositions. A drug market can continue functioning despite repeated seizures if suppliers replace lost consignments, local distributors remain available and the proceeds continue moving. The useful comparison concerns the organisation of the trade: cross-border supply connected to domestic transport, storage, retail markets and financial intermediaries. Intercepting a package disrupts one transaction. Dismantling the business requires following the relationships that made it possible.
Drones have become especially important to that model. They reduce the need for a courier to cross the border physically, while leaving reception and distribution to people already on the Indian side. The contraband still needs to be collected, concealed, transported and sold. Technology changes the border crossing; it does not eliminate the local network on which the entire operation depends.
The Arnia investigation is instructive in that respect. Police linked the accused to Pakistan-based gangster Shahzad Bhatti, alleging that he operated under ISI patronage. That remains an attributed investigative allegation. Separately, India’s Home Ministry formally designated the Shahzad Bhatti Network a terrorist organisation on 16 September, describing a syndicate involved in smuggling weapons, explosives and narcotics and drawing young people and petty criminals into terrorist activity.
The resulting picture differs from the older model of a clearly identifiable militant cadre carrying out every stage of an operation. A criminal intermediary can organise a delivery, another person retrieve it and a distributor arrange the sale, without all participants sharing the same ideological commitment. For a handler interested in violence, an existing trafficking network offers people, transport and access that do not have to be built from scratch.
Investigations in Punjab provide a more explicit account of the alleged financial connection. In an October 2025 supplementary chargesheet in the Salaya case, the National Investigation Agency described the smuggling of 500 kilograms of heroin from Pakistan by sea through Gujarat, followed by transportation to Punjab. The agency alleged that proceeds financed Lashkar-e-Taiba. Its account identified a transnational network involving organisers abroad and people responsible for logistics, storage and distribution within India.
These are prosecution allegations, rather than a substitute for judicial findings against every accused. Their relevance lies in the network they describe. Punjab could function as a distribution centre even when the narcotics entered through Gujarat. Jammu can similarly become an entry or transit point for a market extending beyond its own boundaries. Administrative borders divide police jurisdictions much more neatly than they divide illicit commerce.
A separate NIA chargesheet in November 2025 alleged a Pakistan-linked arms and narcotics network spanning Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab, with consignments delivered near the frontier by drones. The agency described an overlap between weapons suppliers, drug traffickers and criminal gangs. Taken together, such cases support scrutiny of the shared infrastructure of trafficking and violence, rather than the assumption that every drug consignment belongs to an isolated local racket.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the supplied incident record shows several variations of that infrastructure. Recoveries near the International Border have repeatedly been linked by investigators to suspected drone deliveries. Other cases point towards the Uri sector and routes across the Line of Control. An August investigation began with the seizure of more than five kilograms of heroin in Jammu, led to arrests of Baramulla residents and extended to Leh. The alleged supply chain crossed several jurisdictions before its participants were brought together in one investigation.
The geographical range is important because it challenges the idea that the problem can be contained solely at the point of entry. Border surveillance is necessary, but narcotics acquire their financial value through markets and intermediaries further inland. Investigators therefore need to establish who pays for consignments, who extends credit, who receives the proceeds and whether money subsequently reaches armed organisations. Finding heroin and a weapon together is a serious lead; establishing the complete financing chain requires further evidence.
There is another reason to resist reducing the entire drug economy to cross-border infiltration. An October operation in Kashmir reportedly recovered more than 218,000 pharmaceutical tablets and capsules, alongside other substances, cash and valuables, with investigators pursuing interstate supply links. The diversion of pharmaceutical products presents different investigative questions from a heroin package dropped near a border village. Both can sustain dependence and criminal profit, but they need not have the same supplier or political beneficiary.
Recognising the security dimension should sharpen the investigation, rather than flatten those differences. Evidence that particular Pakistan-based networks combine narcotics with weapons and terrorist financing does not establish that every local dealer answers to an intelligence handler. Nor does an accused person’s religion or regional identity reveal his role. The networks described in the Arnia case crossed both social and geographical boundaries because their immediate requirements were practical: somebody to receive the goods, somebody to move them and somebody to pay.
The same precision is needed when interpreting official statistics. Parliamentary figures cited for Jammu and Kashmir show recorded seizures falling from 11,066 kilograms in 2023 to 4,491 kilograms in 2025. That decline cannot, on its own, establish a corresponding decline in supply or consumption. Seizure totals depend on enforcement, detection and the substances being counted. Tonnes of mixed contraband are not a reliable single measure of the size of a heroin market.
Likewise, the Kashmir Zone figures presented in November should not be combined casually with separate Union Territory-wide campaign totals. The geographical coverage and reporting periods differ. More useful measures would show whether major suppliers remain active, whether attached assets survive legal scrutiny, whether prosecutions establish financial links and whether networks can replace the people arrested.
Punjab’s experience also makes the public-health dimension impossible to treat as an afterthought. Its addiction crisis has required a substantial treatment response alongside policing. A person dependent on drugs may be exploited as a courier or recruited for payment, but treating dependence itself as evidence of terrorist allegiance would deter families from seeking help and obscure the organisers who profit. Confidential treatment and credible enforcement can weaken different parts of the same market.
The strategic danger is the convergence of interests. A trafficker wants revenue; a criminal gang wants weapons and influence; a militant handler wants funds and people willing to perform limited tasks. They do not need to become one organisation to transact with one another. That flexibility allows a network to survive the exposure of a particular courier, route or local cell.
The Kashmir–Punjab connection should therefore change what counts as success. A seized drone, an arrested distributor and an attached house are significant only insofar as they weaken the business and its capacity to support violence. Otherwise, the state is repeatedly displaying the intercepted merchandise while the enterprise behind it continues trading. The border is where the consignment crosses. The security failure, when the network survives, extends much further inland.










