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Bangladesh’s Shrinking Space to Belong
  • Tagore Rabindranath
    Tagore Rabindranath
Rabindranath Tagore was accused of “Indian aggression” in Dhaka last month. Being dead for eighty-five years offered little protection: on 10 October, four people were detained after an attempt to deface his portrait outside the Bangladesh Shilpakala Academy. One of them, Marzia Khandaker Rimi, invoked resistance to India as the justification. Tagore, whose words Bangladesh sings as its national anthem, had apparently become a foreign intrusion.

The episode was not equivalent to the killings, looting and attacks on places of worship that have unsettled Bangladesh’s minorities. It nevertheless exposed a related ambition: to decide which parts of the country’s inheritance are entitled to remain visible. A Hindu household, a Sufi shrine and a Bengali poet do not present the same target, but hostility towards them can draw on a common proposition—that belonging must be conditional on religious conformity or a politically approved identity.

In Pirganj, Rangpur district, that condition was enforced against three households on 26 October. The homes of Bishu Chandra Mohanta and his brothers Jagadish and Dinesh were vandalised and looted following allegations that a Facebook video shared by Bishu’s son, Saurav, had offended Muslim religious sentiments. According to police, the post was several months old and had been deleted; screenshots subsequently resurfaced. Saurav worked in a garment factory in Gazipur. His relatives’ homes were available for punishment.

The sequence reveals the usefulness of an accusation that requires neither a fresh offence nor individual responsibility. An old post can be recirculated, outrage assembled and an entire family made answerable. Whatever investigators establish about the original video, there is no uncertainty about the principle being imposed on the household: its security depends on the willingness of others to tolerate it.

Other recent deaths demand investigation without having their motives settled in advance. Hindu barber Rabindra Monirishi was stabbed to death in Bhaluka on 27 October; schoolteacher Monoranjan Roy was beaten to death in Parbatipur two days earlier while attempting to resolve a dispute. The burnt body of businessman Suprabhat Modak was recovered in Pabna on 6 October. On 4 November, Zahed Bepari was hacked to death inside a Sufi shrine in Munshiganj. The victims’ identities or the locations of their deaths cannot, by themselves, establish a communal motive. Neither should uncertainty become an excuse to leave families without credible answers.

That credibility is already badly damaged. In January, the interim administration’s account of violence during 2025 acknowledged 645 incidents involving minorities but classified only 71 as communal. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council challenged the assessment, reporting 522 incidents of communal violence. These are competing classifications, not interchangeable totals, and neither can simply be substituted for the other. Yet their divergence exposes a fundamental disagreement about what the state is prepared to recognise.

Monindra Kumar Nath, the Council’s acting general secretary, argued that the official approach excluded killings, sexual violence, arson and land grabbing unless they occurred within temple premises. That was the Council’s criticism, rather than an independently established description of every police investigation. It nevertheless identifies the central problem: a definition so narrow that it discounts the circumstances of intimidation can make a threatened community disappear from the statistics while remaining very much exposed on the ground.

A land dispute and religious targeting are not mutually exclusive explanations. Someone seeking to seize a neighbour’s property may exploit the neighbour’s minority status, mobilise religious hostility or calculate that the police will be reluctant to intervene. Political revenge can work in precisely the same way. Establishing the immediate dispute is the beginning of an investigation into vulnerability, rather than its conclusion.

The upheaval of 2024 made those overlapping motives especially dangerous. Sheikh Hasina’s departure followed a mass movement against her repressive government, but the collapse of her authority also opened opportunities for retaliation. Human Rights Watch documented attacks on Hindus, Ahmadiyya Muslims and ethnic minorities, including the burning of homes and looting of businesses. Hindus were frequently perceived as supporters of the Awami League, allowing religious identity to become a shortcut for presumed political allegiance.

That presumption imposed collective liability on people who owed nobody an explanation of their vote. It also offered a convenient defence of the violence: an attack could be described as political and therefore dismissed as evidence of communal insecurity, even when religion had helped determine who was selected. Recognising this does not require rehabilitating Hasina’s government. Her abuses and the rights of minorities are separate questions; Bangladesh cannot answer the former by making the latter negotiable.

The available figures suggest persistent insecurity, although they do not describe a simple, uninterrupted rise. The Human Rights Support Society recorded 112 incidents targeting minorities in 2024 and 28 involving religious and ethnic minorities in 2025. In the first half of 2026, however, it documented 50 attacks, compared with ten in the corresponding period of 2025; the number injured rose from four to 56. Its July–September report recorded at least six attacks. These remain documented minimums, shaped by reporting and classification, rather than a complete measure of what communities experience.

The pressure also extends beyond non-Muslim minorities. Sufi shrines and Baul traditions embody forms of religious and cultural life that resist rigid boundaries. Their vulnerability shows why this is a struggle over the permissible character of Bangladesh itself. A country can retain its Muslim majority while steadily losing the space in which Muslims practise differently, women perform publicly and inherited traditions survive without seeking ideological clearance.

On 19 October, police recovered and defused a device reported as a bomb at the shrine of Fakir Lalon Shah in Kushtia. In Sunamganj, objections to a Baul gathering scheduled for 22 October invoked the possibility of “obscenity”. Reports differed over whether the programme was ultimately prevented or went ahead despite the objections. The attempt to stop it was revealing enough: opponents sought authority over a cultural gathering by anticipating an offence that had not occurred.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2026 annual report described a related pattern in cases from 2025. A poet, a university student and a Baul singer faced allegations involving religious offence; accusations circulated through social media and, in some cases, brought crowds to the accused. The report also recorded a Hindu man’s lynching following rumours of blasphemous remarks. The threat operates through the interaction of accusation, public mobilisation and punishment, with formal proceedings against the accused sometimes accompanying the danger from the street.

Police intervention does occur. Officers detained those accused in the Tagore mural incident and responded to the discovery at Lalon’s shrine. Such actions matter, but isolated interventions cannot provide lasting reassurance if intimidation continues to determine when a household is safe or a performance can proceed. The relevant test is whether investigations lead to credible accountability and whether threatened people can resume ordinary life.

Before Durga Puja, the Bangladesh Puja Udjapan Parishad reported 34 incidents involving idol vandalism, attacks on temples and related violence, with arrests in eleven cases. Its general secretary, Santosh Sharma, called for protection throughout the year. That demand goes well beyond guards at a festival. A Hindu citizen should be able to run a business, contest a property claim or return home without calculating whether a rumour will turn the neighbourhood against him.

Bangladesh’s political renewal will be judged in those ordinary circumstances. If minorities remain presumed party loyalists, if cultural inheritance can be denounced as foreign aggression and if an allegation of wounded religious sentiment transfers authority to a crowd, equal citizenship becomes a promise with an extensive list of exceptions. Tagore’s portrait can be cleaned. Restoring the confidence of people who are increasingly asked to justify their place in their own country will require considerably more than a coat of paint.