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Khalistan and the ISI’s War by Other Means
  • Khalistan
    Khalistan
One poster invokes the Sikh dead of November 1984 and calls for the Indian diplomatic mission in Rome to be shut down. Another, advertising a Sikhs for Justice rally outside the Chinese consulate in Vancouver on 28 October where people were while waving Chinese, Pakistani and Khalistan flags, carries a rather different appeal: “China ANNEX Arunachal Pradesh.” The distance between the two is considerable, and not merely geographical. A campaign claiming the right to self-determination invites a foreign power to seize somebody else’s territory, hundreds of kilometres from the homeland it proposes to liberate. Sovereignty, apparently, deserves protection only where its violation would inconvenience India. The Rome poster announces a demonstration for 1 November outside the Indian embassy. The Vancouver material names Sikhs for Justice, displays Xi Jinping and offers support for Chinese annexation of an Indian state. Neither establishes Chinese operational sponsorship. The political offer, however, is explicit: a separatist campaign seeking foreign patrons has made itself available to a territorial agenda extending well beyond Punjab. For Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, the utility of such a convergence is familiar. Khalistan need never become a state to remain useful against India. The origins of the demand also deserve rescuing from the convenient chronology through which it is often presented. On 13 October 1971, Jagjit Singh Chauhan took out an advertisement in the New York Times proclaiming a separate Sikh nation. “Today we are launching the final crusade,” it declared. “We are a nation in our own right.” This was an early international declaration of the project, thirteen years before Operation Blue Star. Overseas publicity was already doing work that would ordinarily require a political constituency at home. In June 1984, Operation Blue Star sought to dislodge Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the armed militants who had fortified positions inside the Golden Temple complex. The fighting, civilian deaths and damage to Sikhism’s holiest shrine left profound wounds, compounded by the organised massacres of Sikhs after Indira Gandhi’s assassination and decades of failures to deliver justice. Those grievances are real. They neither explain away the armed occupation of the complex nor grant subsequent organisations permanent ownership of Sikh suffering. Pakistan did not need to invent the wounds to find people willing to exploit them. The diaspora became indispensable to the separatist campaign’s international survival. Canada, Britain and Italy supplied platforms, organisers and fundraising opportunities; Pakistan offered militant leaders sanctuary. Their combination helps explain how a campaign can remain conspicuous abroad without demonstrating a comparable mandate among the people whose territory it proposes to detach from India. A ballot box in Rome or Canada can count the preferences of those who attend. It cannot confer sovereignty over Punjab, however impressive the photographs accompanying the result. Even the proposed liberation has an accommodating geography. Campaigns centred on separating Indian Punjab routinely leave Pakistan’s Punjab outside their immediate demands, despite the central place of Lahore and Nankana Sahib in Sikh history. The civilisation is invoked in its entirety; the state governing a substantial part of its inheritance is spared the proposed dismemberment. Khalistan stops obediently at Wagah like Christ at Eboli. Prospective patrons must, after all, be allowed to retain their territory. The attempt to join Kashmir and Khalistan gave this alignment an explicit political form. Pakistani-born British peer Nazir Ahmed publicly promoted both causes, while the Kashmir2Khalistan campaign presented them as parts of a common struggle against India. Sikh separatist banners appeared alongside Pakistani-organised mobilisation over Kashmir in Italy, and Sikhs for Justice supplied an overseas referendum campaign. For Pakistan, the advantage is clear: its confrontation with India acquires another constituency and a minority-rights vocabulary extending beyond Kashmir. The Vancouver appeal now offers Beijing a similar bargain, with Arunachal Pradesh included at no apparent cost to those offering it. The ISI connection, however, rests on considerably more than shared platforms and congenial slogans. In August 2013, India’s Home Ministry told Parliament that intelligence indicated ISI operatives had offered financial and other support to pro-Khalistan elements. It described an investigation into funds allegedly reaching Babbar Khalsa International operatives in Punjab from Britain, with material and logistical assistance from the organisation’s Pakistan-based leadership. The arrangement already contained the essential division of labour: overseas financing, coordination and sanctuary in Pakistan, violence inside India. Subsequent investigations supplied names and operations. In the Karnal explosives case of 2022, the National Investigation Agency alleged that Pakistan-based Babbar Khalsa operative Harwinder Singh, known as Rinda, coordinated deliveries of arms, ammunition and explosives at the behest of Pakistan’s intelligence agency. In March 2025, the NIA charged Rinda and the then US-based Harpreet Singh, known as Happy Passia, alongside two others over the September 2024 grenade attack in Chandigarh. These remain prosecution allegations, but their substance is precise: the provision of weapons and the organisation of attacks through intermediaries operating across borders. This is where the geopolitical purpose acquires practical means. A handler in Pakistan, an intermediary in a Western country and recruits inside India place distance between sponsorship and execution. The man carrying out the attack need not possess a coherent theory of Sikh nationhood. A debt, a criminal connection, a promise of money or the prospect of status can suffice. An intelligence sponsor interested in destabilisation has little reason to insist on ideological purity when an existing gang can provide the necessary labour. Recent reporting from Punjab’s border districts describes the environment in which such arrangements flourish: police posts facing grenade threats, gang leaders directing activities from abroad and young men volunteering for criminal assignments. Officers speak of shootings commissioned for as little as 5,000 to 15,000 rupees, sometimes without payment of even the promised sum. The killing of Assistant Sub-Inspector Iqbal Singh in Tarn Taran is being examined through local gang rivalries involving his son’s alleged connections. Such rivalries do not require a foreign author. They do create people, routes and vulnerabilities that a foreign sponsor can exploit. Extortion, drug trafficking and political protection sustain that supply. The same intermediary may move narcotics, procure weapons, collect money and recruit an attacker, allowing a political operation to retain the outward appearance of ordinary crime. Conversely, a militant claim can lend political grandeur to violence performed for cash. From the ISI’s perspective, the distinction is useful chiefly because it complicates everybody else’s investigation. The intermediary’s usefulness matters more than his preferred professional description. Italy has appeared in this machinery as more than a venue for demonstrations. In the NIA’s account of the targeted killings and attempted killings committed in Punjab in 2016–17, funds reached the perpetrators through Italy, Britain and Australia. The agency alleged recruitment and training links involving Italy and the United Arab Emirates, with day-to-day coordination by Pakistan-based Harmeet Singh. This describes a transnational operation with identifiable logistical components, far removed from an argument over the meaning of a flag. The Italian financial connection also predates those cases. Investigators examining the 2008 Mumbai attacks traced a payment through a Brescia money-transfer business for a VoIP account used in communications connected to the attackers. Italian investigators said the payment had been requested from Pakistan. This does not establish a single financial organisation behind jihadist and Sikh militant activity. It does demonstrate why apparently ordinary transactions in northern Italy can matter to the preparation of violence thousands of kilometres away. Gurdwaras and community gatherings give campaign organisers access to donors, volunteers and the legitimacy of religious institutions. Italy’s substantial Sikh population makes it valuable territory for overseas mobilisation. Advocacy, unofficial referendums and terrorist financing are different activities, and India’s ban on Sikhs for Justice does not turn every supporter abroad into a Babbar Khalsa operative. The investigative obligation is to follow particular collections to their recipients and intermediaries. Calling a payment a donation explains how it was solicited; it leaves open what it eventually purchased. The conflicts surrounding diaspora institutions have also produced intimidation in Italy. In September 2023, three Molotov cocktails were thrown at the Novellara home of Iqbal Singh, a community leader and vice-president of Unione Sikh Italia, who subsequently received police protection. Reporting identified tensions involving Khalistan among the possible lines of inquiry. That episode supplies no established ISI connection, but it does show why threats against community figures require more attention than a passing reference to disagreements among expatriates. Treating the Sikh community collectively as suspect would merely assist organisations claiming to speak in its name. Their claim to representation is itself an instrument of power: the authority of an entire diaspora can be appropriated, then scrutiny of particular operatives presented as hostility towards Sikhs. Investigators should refuse both propositions. A community is not an organisation’s property, and religious legitimacy cannot settle questions about financial transfers, weapons or intimidation. Western governments, meanwhile, often encounter fragments of the same problem: a demonstration for the police, a remittance for financial regulators, a threatening video for a platform, an Indian allegation for the foreign ministry. Connections disappear between jurisdictions and administrative categories. Where Pakistani sponsorship is established, this fragmentation gives its intermediaries room to operate across boundaries that constrain the institutions pursuing them. Deniability is sustained as much by the failure to assemble the evidence as by the concealment of any individual transaction. The convergence with jihadist networks follows the same strategic logic. Sikh separatists and Islamist militants need not agree about theology or the societies they wish to build. An intelligence sponsor can find uses for both against the same country, drawing on intermediaries, illicit routes and sanctuary. The relevant affinity lies in the target. The assertion of an independent identity by each organisation helps preserve the sponsor’s distance from the violence it enables. A sovereign Khalistan would require territory, popular consent and a political settlement. Keeping Punjab vulnerable requires money, weapons, handlers and enough recruits prepared to kill. The investigations into Pakistan-based operatives concern those practical requirements. Western governments can spend another decade debating the symbolism of the flags. For the ISI, the useful product is the violence. Khalistan can remain permanently under construction.
Francesca Marino