Bangladesh’s Rohingya refugee camps
In May 2026 alone, several violent incidents highlighted the depth of this instability. On May 14, Hasan Ahmed, a 45-year-old Rohingya man linked to the Zakir Bahini, was shot dead in the Nayapara registered refugee camp in Teknaf. Police attributed the killing to rivalry involving Saddam Bahini, citing competition over camp dominance, control of a mosque committee, and previous enmity. Two days earlier, Hasmat Ullah, a 22-year-old Rohingya youth, was injured in a clash between armed groups in Camp-8 at Balukhali. The dispute reportedly involved the Arakan Rohingya Army, also known as the Nabi Hossain Bahini, and the Arakan Rohingya Organization. These incidents were preceded by the killing of Mohammad Kamal Prakash Noor, the younger brother of Nabi Hossain, and the death of ARO commander Kefayet Ullah Halim in fighting with ARSA.
Together, these events show how deeply militarised the camp environment has become. Groups such as ARSA, ARA, ARO, Saddam Bahini, and Zakir Bahini appear to be competing not merely for survival, but for authority within the camps. Their struggle extends into camp governance, informal leadership structures, mosque committees, and criminal economies. The targeting of local leaders and commanders is especially significant because these figures often act as intermediaries between refugees, aid organisations, and Bangladeshi authorities. Their elimination suggests an effort by armed groups to capture or disrupt informal governance inside the settlements.
The scale of violence remains worrying. According to partial data collated by the Institute for Conflict Management, at least four people had been killed and three injured in Rohingya-insurgency-linked incidents in Bangladesh in 2026 up to May 24. In 2025, at least 37 people were killed, while 2024 recorded 42 deaths. The peak came in 2023, when 95 people were killed in such violence. Although the numbers in 2026 remain lower so far, the pattern of factional killings and armed competition suggests that the security situation remains volatile.
A further concern is the possible emergence of transnational extremist linkages. In May 2026, Bangladeshi police arrested a Rohingya youth in Teknaf for alleged involvement with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan through an Urdu-language WhatsApp group accused of encouraging terrorist activity. Earlier, in April, four ARSA cadres were arrested in Dhaka for alleged links with TTP. These cases do not yet prove the existence of a formal TTP infrastructure inside the Rohingya camps, but they do reveal the vulnerability of displaced Rohingya youth to online radicalisation and external extremist narratives. Prolonged statelessness, unemployment, insecurity, and frustration create conditions in which digital propaganda can find receptive audiences.
The situation is further complicated by developments across the border in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Continued violence involving the Myanmar military, the Arakan Army, and Rohingya communities has sustained refugee flows into Bangladesh and undermined prospects for repatriation. Human Rights Watch reported in May 2026 on the massacre of Rohingya civilians in Hoyasiri, Myanmar, accusing the Arakan Army of killing hundreds of civilians and burning villages in 2024. Meanwhile, landmines, abductions, and cross-border firing continue to endanger both Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi border communities. Incidents involving injured Rohingya civilians, detained fishermen, and stray bullets from Myanmar illustrate how insecurity in Rakhine spills directly into Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s security challenge has therefore become multi-layered. Authorities must manage violence inside densely populated camps, prevent armed groups from expanding their influence, control illegal weapons and drug networks, and monitor possible extremist linkages. At the same time, they must avoid treating the entire Rohingya population as a security threat. The overwhelming majority of Rohingya refugees remain victims of displacement, persecution, and statelessness. Heavy-handed measures risk deepening alienation and creating precisely the conditions that armed groups exploit.
The 2026 election period demonstrated how sensitive this balance has become. Bangladeshi authorities warned that armed groups, illegal weapons, rumour campaigns, and cross-border clashes could disrupt law and order. Security forces increased patrols and conducted large-scale operations, including the detention of Rohingya refugees found outside designated camps. While such measures may address immediate security concerns, they do not resolve the deeper drivers of instability.
At the heart of the crisis is the unresolved status of the Rohingya people. UNHCR data cited in May 2026 indicates that around 149,769 Rohingya refugees were newly registered in Bangladesh between December 2024 and March 31, 2026, bringing the total registered Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh’s camps to approximately 1,194,123. This continued displacement reflects the failure to create safe, dignified, and voluntary conditions for return to Myanmar.
The growing militancy in and around the Rohingya camps is therefore not only a law-and-order problem. It is the product of a prolonged humanitarian crisis, failed repatriation efforts, insecurity in Myanmar, and the absence of meaningful prospects for a displaced population. Bangladesh faces the difficult task of securing the camps while preserving humanitarian protections. Without addressing the structural roots of displacement, statelessness, and political exclusion, armed factions will continue to find space to recruit, intimidate, and expand their influence.
The Rohingya crisis has entered a dangerous phase. What began as one of the world’s largest refugee emergencies now risks hardening into a chronic security crisis with local, national, and regional implications. Bangladesh cannot manage this burden alone. A durable response will require stronger international support, pressure for accountability in Myanmar, improved camp governance, protection for vulnerable refugees, and targeted action against armed networks. Without such a comprehensive approach, the camps of Cox’s Bazar may remain trapped between humanitarian despair and escalating militancy.
