Fifty-six people were killed and about two hundred injured in the July 30 suicide attack on a Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (Jui-F) rally in Pakistan's northwestern Bajaur district. The Jui-F is one of Pakistan's leading Islamist political parties, is part of the Pakistani ruling coalition led by Shahbaz Sharif, enjoys very close ties with the Deobandi confessional madrasa network found somewhat throughout Pakistan, and has strong ideological and personal ties with the Taliban. The attack was claimed by Isis-K, where K stands for Khorasan, the local faction of Isis. This is actually not the first time that the Isis-K (or ISKP) has attacked the Jui-F in Bajaur: according to local sources, and according to some statements by Maulana Fazlur Rehman who heads the Jui-F, there have been about twenty-three attacks on party members in recent years. According to the official narrative, the reason for the attacks would be quite obvious: the Jui-F's support for Pakistan's (shaky and questionable) democracy and the Islamic party's ideological proximity to the Afghan Taliban and the government they lead. A government that, again according to the official narrative, would be a sworn enemy of the Islamic State and its affiliates. The narrative then goes on to highlight the increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the past year, 232 more or less, by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Ttp), the so-called 'Pakistani Taliban' who are also fighting against the very democratic and liberal government in Islamabad. A government that, as has been the case regularly for the past two decades, periodically raises the alarm that the nuclear-armed country is the prime victim of Islamic terrorism, and terrorism has been on the rise since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. This is generally followed by demands for weapons, funding and assorted aid. All clear? Not quite. Isis-K was formed in 2017 from the split of Isis Levant, which split into two factions: one led by Ustad Moawya and another led by Aslam Faroqqi. Farooqi's men, who led Isis-K, were Pakistani and managed remotely by Isi, military intelligence, which provided financial and logistical support by sheltering fighters in Pakistan's tribal areas. At the time, Afghanistan's National Department of Security (NDS) denounced Faroqqi's ties to the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The flower of Pakistani jihad, in short. And, again according to NDS, Isis-K went from being an insignificant little group to a major player on the Afghan scene only with the help of Pakistan. By basically doing, under a different brand, all the 'dirty' jobs that the Taliban, sitting at the Doha negotiating table at the time, could not or would not claim as their own. It is worth noting that in the recent past, several Taliban members have also hinted that they believe the ISKP operates on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. Just as it is worth noting that terrorism resurfaces in Pakistan, with the consequent atomic threat in the hands of the jihadi, whenever the country finds itself in a corner and in need of money. The same old 'Musharraf recipe, which Islamabad has no intention of abandoning just as it has no intention of changing its main strategy, which is also its primary asset: chaos. The breeding of jihadist groups all trained and run by the same masters but ready, when needed, to clash with each other. Good terrorists ready to turn bad and be officially abandoned when the pressure is too great. The important thing, is to always have a pressure tool at hand. After all, for the military, the nearly seven hundred victims of terrorist attacks in Pakistan this year are just 'collateral damage.' Because, as Hillary Clinton said years ago, "You can't raise snakes in your backyard and then expect them to bite only your neighbors."